Thursday, June 11, 2009

Amherst Securities F's JP Morgan In The A

Amherst is an outsourced mortgage research shop that lots of smart non-mortgage hedge funds rely on for research and advice.

This WSJ article is pure genius. Anyone who doesn't think Wall Street banks wouldn't do the same exact thing given the chance are fooling themselves. If the JPM guys had been smart, they would have utilized the exact same strategy (buying the underlying mortgages at the end) and make sure they were not paid off but instead defaulted.

Some highlights below:

A canny trade by a small brokerage firm in two markets at the heart of the financial crisis has left some of the biggest players on Wall Street crying foul.

The trade, by Amherst Holdings of Austin, Texas, was particularly galling to the big banks because it turned what they believed was a sure-fire profit into a loss.

The burned banks include J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC and Bank of America Corp. Some banks have reached out to two industry trade groups about Amherst's actions, and the groups are reviewing the transaction, according to people familiar with their thinking. "It's all-out warfare" between the banks and Amherst, said a senior banker at one firm that lost money.

...

The trade involved credit-default swaps and securities backed by subprime mortgages. The original securities had been sold by Lehman Brothers and were backed by $335 million of subprime mortgages mostly on homes in California made at the housing bubble's peak in 2005, according to the prospectus.

Following a wave of refinancing and defaults, only $29 million of the loans were left outstanding by March 2009, half of which were delinquent or in default, according to a performance report by Moody's Investors Service.

Believing the securities would become worthless, traders at J.P. Morgan bought credit-default swaps over the past year from Amherst, according to people familiar with the matter. Credit-default swaps act like insurance, paying off the buyer if securities are hit by losses. Other banks including RBS Securities, which is the U.S. investment-banking arm of Royal Bank of Scotland, and BofA also bought swaps on the securities from different trading partners.

The banks had to pay up for the protection, similar to a person buying insurance on a beach house just before a hurricane. They paid as much as 80 to 90 cents for every dollar of insurance, the going rate last fall according to dealer quotes, expecting to receive a dollar back when the securities became worthless over the coming months.

Traders can buy credit-default swaps on securities they don't own. At one point, at least $130 million of bets had been made on the performance of around $27 million in securities, according to a person familiar with the matter.

In late April, traders at some banks were shocked to find out from monthly remittance reports that the bonds they had bet against had been paid off in full. Normally an investor can't pay off loans like that but if the amount of outstanding loans falls to less than 10% of the original pool, the servicer -- or company that collects mortgage payments from homeowners and forwards them to investors who own the securities -- can buy them and make bondholders whole.

That's what happened in this case. In April, a servicer called Aurora Loan Services at the behest of Amherst purchased the remaining loans and paid off the bonds.

Although Amherst won't provide specifics and won't comment on its arrangement with Aurora, it doesn't deny that it took this approach. (Aurora says it is a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Bank, but not part of the Lehman Brothers Holdings bankruptcy filing.)

...

When the bonds got paid off, the swaps became worthless, meaning the banks effectively forfeited what they had paid for the insurance. J.P. Morgan lost millions, while RBS and BofA suffered minimal losses, said people familiar with the matter.

...

Since the mortgage securities were valued at just $3 million or so in the market, well below the $27 million they were redeemed for, traders believe Amherst entered into an uneconomic transaction to profit from its swap positions.

We here at TILB love this stuff. WSJ continues its streak of excellent reporting.

Mark Haines Of CNBC And Barney Frank Have a Cat Fight

Barney Frank decides to participate in an interview on CNBC about executive compensation. When people actually challenge the logic of his approach, Barney's cat claws predictable decend.

Mark Haines and CNBS win the ensuing catfight by taking the moral high road...not that being on a higer moral plane than Barney Frank represents much of a challenge.

The fireworks begin with Haines questions around 4:45 or so:



Option ARM Reset Wave Threatens Housing Rebound

A Bloomberg exclusive.

Some highlights (lowlights?) below. Whitney Tilson's ubiquitous mortgage presentation cited.

What's crazy is the talk about a 73 year old lady, Shirley Breitmaier, who's mortgage payment is skyrocketing from $98/month (which I'm sure was the minimum allowable payment) to $3,500. That's in paragraph one. About half way into the story we find out her mortgage was a $313,000 loan.

So, $98 was insanely low and she was/is clearly neg am'ing massively ($98/month actually equates to 3/8s of 1% annually!). Her loan is particularly lax as it allows her to neg am to 145% (so nearly $450,000) of the original loan balance though most Option ARMs cap that amount at 115-120% of the initial balance. Also, her loan was a re-fi as she's lived in the house for decades, which makes it a sad human story (hopefully she had fun with all the money).

People often get very angry at the lender in these cases, but forget that the borrower in a re-fi got a huge amount of cash and chose to do something with that money. I have sympathy, but it's limited by this fact.

The rational outcome for all sides is for her to deed the house back to the mortgage holder now and let them deal with the problem before housing values plummet further in exchange for them not crushing her credit standing:

June 11 (Bloomberg) -- Shirley Breitmaier’s mortgage payment started out at $98 when she refinanced her three-bedroom home in Galt, California, in 2007. [does anyone else find the name of this town ironic? - TILB] The 73-year-old widow may see it jump to $3,500 a month in two years.

Breitmaier took out a payment-option adjustable rate mortgage, a loan popular during the housing boom for its low minimum payments before resetting at higher costs later.

About 1 million option ARMs are estimated to reset higher in the next four years, according to real estate data firm First American CoreLogic of Santa Ana, California. About three quarters of those loans will adjust next year and in 2011, with the peak coming in August 2011 when about 54,000 loans recast, the data show.

Option ARM borrowers hit with unaffordable monthly payments are another threat to the housing recovery and the economy, said Susan Wachter, a professor of real estate finance at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School in Philadelphia. Owners who surrender properties to the bank rather than make higher payments for homes that have plummeted in value will further depress real estate prices and add to the inventory of properties on the market, she said.

“The option ARM recasts will drive up the foreclosure supply, undermining the recovery in the housing market,” Wachter said in an interview. “The option ARMs will be part of the reason that the path to recovery will be long and slow.”

More than $750 billion of option ARMs were originated in the U.S. between 2004 and 2008, according to data from First American and Inside Mortgage Finance of Bethesda, Maryland. California accounted for 58 percent of option ARMs, according to a report by T2 Partners LLC, citing data from Amherst Securities and Loan Performance.

...

Shirley Breitmaier took out a $315,000 option ARM to refinance a previous loan on her house.

Her payments started at 3/8 of 1 percent, or less than $100 a month, according to Cameron Pannabecker, the owner of Cal-Pro Mortgage and the Mortgage Modification Center in Stockton, California, who is working with Breitmaier. The loan allowed her to forgo higher payments by adding the unpaid balance to the principal. She’ll be required to start paying principal and interest to amortize the debt when the loan reaches 145 percent of the original amount borrowed.

...

Breitmaier, who has been in the home for 45 years and lives with her daughter, now fears she will lose the off-white stucco house that’s a hub for her family.

I wish the government would bail us out like the banks and the car businesses,”[emphasis added by TILB - and out politicians wonder why people hate them] she said. “I’d like to go from here to the grave next to my husband.”

...

“This loan is a perfect example front to back, bottom to top, of everything that has gone wrong over the last five to seven years,” Pannabecker said. “The consumer had a product pushed on them that they had no hope of understanding.”

...

“The problem is, real estate values went down,” Paul said. [not the shit-poor underwriting standards, of course - TILB]

Option ARMs typically recast after five years and the lower payments can end before that time if the loan balance increases to 110 percent or 125 percent of the original mortgage, according to a Federal Reserve brochure on its Web site.

...

Refinancing is impossible in many states given the nationwide drop in prices. In California, the median existing single-family home price dropped 37 percent in April to $256,700 from a year earlier, according to the state Association of Realtors.

...

The delinquency rate for payment-option ARMs originated in 2006 and bundled into securities is soaring, according to a May 5 report from Deutsche Bank AG. Over the past year, payments 60 days late or more on option ARMs originated in 2006 have almost doubled to 42.44 percent from 23.26 percent, Deutsche Bank said. For 2007 loans, the rate has climbed from 10.1 percent to 35.25 percent. [emphasis added]

...

“There’s a level of hopelessness to the phone calls now,” said Brown [a borrower advocate].



Anyway, great article. Bloomberg's been on this story as well as anyone, so kudos to them.

Happy green shoots!

-------------------------------

Let us know what you think about the debacle in housing!

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Bob Rodriguez Of First Pacific Advisors (FPA) Has Been Busy Warning Us All

What follows is the transcript of a speech Rodriguez gave at the Morningstar conference a week or two ago (hat tip: TD and CM). It is an absolute must read.

For those of you that don't know Rodriguez, he has one of the best mutual fund track records out there and he and his partners have done it by maintaining healthy skepticism, employing vision out beyond that typically employed, and by taking less risk, not more.

Rodriguez also recently published this OpEd in Barron's titled V-Shaped Recovery Outlook Is In Vain in which he raises the critical question of who will finance all the debt the US intends to take. For those of you that read our debunking of Irving Fisher's Debt-Deflation prescription, you know the second half of it was dedicated to addressing this issue and identifying it as the challenge of our times.

Anyway, Rodriguez's thoughtful Morningstar speech is below. I'll summarize his view (and ours) as beware of strangers bearing gifts. When our government proposes to intervene in order to "solve" our problems, it generally creates a problem of at least equal size and it leads down a road toward treachery and despair. Read it and learn.

May 29, 2009
Robert L. Rodriguez
Partner and Chief Executive Officer

Good morning.

I want to thank Morningstar for this honor of speaking to you today. We go back a long time, beginning in 1986, when Don Phillips became the very first analyst to cover my two funds, FPA Capital and FPA New Income. I am deeply grateful for having been selected three times for the Morningstar Manager of the Year award and being recognized for my work in both equity and fixed income management.

For those of you who do not know, I will be taking a sabbatical beginning next year. My trusted partners, Dennis Bryan and Rikard Ekstrand will assume leadership of FPA Capital Fund while Tom Atteberry will do the same for FPA New Income. These three outstanding managers are here today should any of you wish to meet and speak with them. Having a high degree of confidence in them as well as FPA, I will be leaving all my personal investments in the various funds and will retain my equity ownership in the firm. Many executives say they have confidence in their associates but few demonstrate this in such a tangible way. I will return 2011 in a supporting role. My decision to take a sabbatical has nothing to do with the current tumultuous market or my health. More than six years ago, I discussed this as a possibility. I consider this step part of the process of succession planning and execution.

This will complete my 39th year in the investment business, 35 of these being as a money manager and analyst, with 25 at FPA. It has been a wonderful experience, though a humbling one at times. I believe I have found success because I have been deeply aware of the need to balance the human emotions of greed and fear. In a word, DISCIPLINE. As a board member on the University of Southern California’s Student Investment Fund program, I tell our students that discipline is a key attribute to becoming a successful investor. I stress that, without a strong set of fundamental rules and a core philosophy, they will be sailing a course through the treacherous investment seas without a compass or a rudder. I also emphasize the importance of integrity and tell them that they can spend a lifetime building their reputation and, if they are not vigilant, they can lose it in a day.

I have always maintained my professional and personal integrity. I have never wavered, despite having paid some very high prices. It seems as though it was a lifetime ago in 1986, when I had few assets under management, and the consultant to my largest account insisted that, if I wanted to continue the relationship, I had to pay to play. I was shocked, dismayed and speechless. Though this would probably have never become public, if I had agreed, how would I have ever lived with myself? By not agreeing, it meant that I would lose nearly 40% of my business. When I was fired shortly thereafter, this termination compromised my efforts in the raising of new money for nearly six years because I could not say why. Despite the pain and humiliation, there was no price high enough for me to compromise my integrity. With the subsequent disclosures of improprieties at this municipal pension plan, the cloud of suspicion over me ultimately lifted. I not only survived, I prospered.

I relay this short story because it conveys some beliefs that will run throughout my speech today entitled, “Reflections and Outrage.” I will make some comments and observations about our industry, the government and then provide a brief financial market forecast. These are my honest opinions for better or worse.

The Mutual Fund Industry
Let’s be frank about last year’s performance, it was a terrible one for the market averages as well as for mutual fund active portfolio managers. It did not matter the style, asset class or geographic region. In a word, we stunk. We managers did not deliver the goods and we must explain why. In upcoming shareholder letters, will this failure be chalked up to bad luck, an inability to identify a changing governmental environment or to some other excuse? We owe our shareholders more than simple platitudes, if we expect to regain their confidence.

Diversification effectively failed as a strategy. All asset classes, other than cash, gold or Treasury securities, lost money. If Morningstar will allow me a small transgression by quoting Lipper Research, “Equity funds posted their worst one-year return in Lipper’s 49-year-old database.” It didn’t matter whether they were U.S. diversified equity funds or world equity funds with declines of 37.5% and 45.8%, respectively--so much for decoupling. This is a concept we never subscribed to at FPA.

For the record, my own fund, FPA Capital, was not a stellar performer either. It was down 34.8%, although it did outperform the average diversified domestic equity fund and mid-cap value fund. In my latest shareholder letter, I discuss the reasons for this lousy performance and attempt to explain why I believe it is only temporary versus other types of performance declines that appear to be more permanent.

The same criticism can be leveled at fixed income managers as well, since domestic and world income funds lost money last year. Only Treasury and GNMA bond funds provided positive returns. Our bond fund, FPA New Income, however, did perform extremely well by achieving a positive total return, our 25th year in a row during our management, and its widest performance differential versus its peers.

Did the industry try and prepare for this tsunami of a credit debacle? I don’t think so. Whether in stocks or in bonds, it seems as though the same old strategies were followed--be fully invested for fear of underperforming and don’t diverge from your benchmark too far and risk index tracking error. The industry drove into this credit debacle at full speed. If active managers maintain this course, I fear the long-term outlook for their funds, as well as their employment, will be at high risk. If they do not reflect upon what they have done wrong in this cycle and attempt to correct their errors, why should their investors expect a different outcome the next time?

Investors have long memories, especially when they lose money. As an example, prior to FPA’s acquisition of FPA Capital Fund in July 1984, the predecessor fund was a poster child for bad performance from the 1960s era. Each time the Fund hit a $10 NAV, it would get a raft of redemptions since this was its original issue price and investors thought they were now finally even and just wanted out. This trend eventually stopped in late 1987, twenty years after the Fund’s founding. I believe investors will react in a similar fashion after this market collapse.

During the 1998-2000 performance derby races, a head long rush into speculation took place when growth stock “investment” managers chased Monopoly money-like stocks called “dot com” and other types of technology stocks. The fear of being left behind by not owning them was quite evident and I was utterly shocked and dismayed by their capricious actions. Where was their discipline? What were they thinking and did they ever consider how they might destroy their client’s capital? At the time, I referred to dot com company valuations as, “not only discounting the future but also the hereafter.” Did these managers learn anything and have they reflected upon what went wrong and how they would change their investment management for the better? The academic community wrote very little on this period but an original thinker and my late friend, Louis Lowenstein, did so in his paper, “Searching for Rational Investors in a Perfect Storm.” I recommend it. Why should individual investors and others trust managers who threw investment caution to the wind? This type of recklessness undermines the basic justification for active investment management versus simply being invested in Index funds.

While technology stock and growth stock investing hysteria were running wild, we did not participate in this madness. Instead, we sold most of our technology stocks. Our “reward” for this discipline was to watch FPA Capital Fund’s assets decline from over $700 million to just above $300 million, through net redemptions, while not losing any money for this period. We were willing to pay this price of asset outflow because we knew that, no matter what, our investment discipline would eventually be recognized. With our reputation intact, we then had a solid foundation on which we could rebuild our business. This cannot be said for many growth managers, or firms, who violated their clients’ trust.

We also did not run with the herd in 2005 and 2006, and thus, FPA New Income’s assets declined from $2.1 billion to $1.6 billion. This process began in 2003 when we deployed an extremely defensive portfolio strategy whereby we would no longer buy any intermediate or long-term Treasury bonds because, in our opinion, they were devoid of any investment merit. We considered the monetary policy being implemented by former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to be insane and that it would create another bubble. Little did we know how big it would become. Because of the low yield environment, new types of securities were created to meet the demand for an enhanced yield. We did not chase yield by purchasing these highly complex, purported to be high-quality, securitized alphabet soup labeled securities created by propeller heads. Reaching for yield, in a low yield environment or because of competition, always leads to disaster, as reflected by the carnage in so many bond and money market funds last year.

It would be unfair of me to level criticism just at growth managers. Many value managers have a lot of explaining to do as well, given last year’s poor performance, driven largely by an overweighting in financial stocks. How did they miss the greatest credit excess in the modern era? How could we have a pandemic breakdown in loan underwriting standards and so many managers miss it? What were they doing in their research? After the collapse of Bear Stearns, I reviewed the changes in portfolio holdings of many value managers and saw additions to their holdings in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, and Washington Mutual, to name a few. What were they thinking?

In contrast to these actions, our firm expressed the view, in our March 30, 2008, website commentary, “Crossing the Rubicon,” that we had crossed over into a new financial system and new era that required great caution since a new set of economic ground rules was being created and the shape of the playing field could not yet be determined. Because of the changed nature of our financial system, we felt that a significantly higher hurdle rate had become necessary for most financial stock and bond investments. For the industry in general, rather than demonstrating caution, it seemed as though each week another “expert” was calling for a bottom in financial stocks. If portfolio managers and analysts cannot recognize the greatest credit blow-off in the last 80 years, when will they? What new procedures and policies have they implemented at their firms to address this new environment and protect them from making similar mistakes in the future? I believe these are questions that must be answered in order to regain and retain investor trust.

I am not without shame. I wrote about my worst investment failure, Conseco, in FPA’s first website commentary in 2002. My failure was in not recognizing the breakdown in its underwriting standards that led to lending excesses. I analyzed what critical variables I had missed and discussed my errors openly in my shareholder letters and other public communications. Both Tom Atteberry and I served on the creditor’s committee rather than take the easier road by saying, “It’s a loss and a waste of time, so let’s move on to the next investment.” Out of this bankruptcy, we developed a template that could be applied to the credit excesses that were to come later, but on a far wider scale. By being totally open about my failure, I believe it has enhanced my personal credibility.

Having the courage to be different comes at a steep price, but I believe it can result in deep satisfaction and personal reward. As an example, FPA Capital Fund has experienced heavy net redemptions since the beginning of 2007, totaling more than $770 million on a base of $2.1 billion. My strong conviction that an elevated level of liquidity was necessary, at one point reaching 45%, placed me at odds with many of our shareholders. I estimate that approximately 60% left because of this strategy. One relationship withdrew $300 million because my policy upset their asset allocation model. We have been penalized for taking precautionary measures leading up to and during a period of extraordinary risk. Though frustrating, in our hearts, we know that our long-term investment focus serves our clients well. I believe the words of John Maynard Keynes as expressed in his book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), are reflective of our investment style. He said, “Investment based on genuine long-term expectations is so difficult today as to be scarcely practicable,” and “It is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest, who will in practice come in for the most criticism wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is the essence of his behaviour that he should be eccentric, unconventional, and rash in the eyes of average opinion.”

We are again running contrary to the consensus, shifting course in our equity investment strategy in a way many would consider to be high risk. We deployed more capital than at any other period in the last 25 years, late last year and early this year, with 67% directed into energy stocks. This added to FPA Capital Fund’s hefty energy exposure that existed prior to the market collapse. Over 50% of the Fund’s equity investments are currently in energy. You may read more about our rationale in the March shareholder letter. We have skewed our research toward companies that will benefit from what I believe to be the beginning of a “New World Order.” In my opinion, the old economic order began at the end of WW2 and ended in 2007. Mercantilist nations in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world operated with the strategy of having a cheap currency that made their exported goods attractively priced for a financially sound and unleveraged American consumer. With the recent collapse of the American consumer’s over-leveraged balance sheet, a new era has begun. Foreign countries will have to restructure their economies to emphasize domestic growth so as to offset the structural reduction of U.S. demand for their exports. China has already begun this process. If my outlook is correct, many sectors of the U.S. economy will be negatively affected. Active managers will have to make some hard choices as to how they deploy capital going forward.

I believe superior long-term performance is a function of a manager’s willingness to accept periods of short-term underperformance. This requires the fortitude and willingness to allow one’s business to shrink while deploying an unpopular strategy. Additionally, in the low return changing world I foresee, a well diversified mutual fund of U.S. stocks will likely have a harder time outperforming the stock averages and index funds, as a result of its higher expense ratio. A more focused strategy will be necessary to excel. If active managers continue to adhere to their old practices, we should see a contraction in the active mutual fund management universe over the next five to ten years. First Pacific Advisors plans to be among the survivors.

Government and the Credit Crisis
What a mess we are in. There is little question that this is the worst economic contraction since the Great Depression. It is worse than a recession but not as bad as the Depression. I have a new word for it, “repression.” From its beginning, I have been of the opinion that this is not a normal recession and that the economy would not respond to typical economic policy stimuli. This idea was expressed in my September 2007 shareholder report.

I wonder why so much credibility is bestowed upon many of our government officials. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan expressed on several occasions that a bubble could not be recognized before it occurred. In his remarks before the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in 1999, he said, “Collapsing confidence is generally described as a bursting bubble, an event incontrovertibly evident only in retrospect.” 1 Apparently, he couldn’t recognize the internet bubble, but when it popped, he attempted to stabilize the economy from its negative effects by implementing a misguided and unsound monetary policy that instead initiated the greatest credit and asset bubbles since the Depression. While Alan Greenspan was in Shanghai in May 2007, the BBC News reported that he said the Chinese stock markets had risen to levels that were “unsustainable” and that they were overvalued. 2 Then, while he was in London in October of that same year, Reuters reported he said, in response to a question about the Shanghai stock market, “If you ever wanted to get a definition of a bubble in the works, that’s it.” 3 How is it that, as the Fed Chairman, he cannot recognize a bubble in the U.S., but as a private citizen, he can travel more than 6,000 miles from Washington and recognize one in a foreign country?

Chairman Bernanke also has his difficulties recognizing bubbles. In a June 2004 interview with The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, not yet Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke said, “I think it’s extraordinarily difficult for the central bank to know in advance or even after the fact whether or not there’s been a bubble in an asset price.” 4 While in October 2005, according to The Washington Post, Mr. Bernanke “does not think the national housing boom is a bubble that is about to burst.” 5 I guess the housing bubble was just too small for the Fed to recognize.

It appears that neither of these Fed Chairmen could recognize the two greatest U.S. bubbles in the last 80 years. In contrast, at FPA, we identified excesses in Alt-A securities back in the summer of 2005 and extended that analysis into subprime and other sections of the credit market. I asked a major savings and loan CEO why he thought we were seeing unexpected deterioration in our Alt-A mortgage pools that was materially different from our experience of the last two decades. His response was, “Fraud.” Upon further investigation, we concluded there was a widespread breakdown in underwriting standards and that this was leading to a blow off in the real estate market as well as other segments of the U.S. economy. In contrast, Fed Chairman Bernanke, in both April and June of 2007, said that there would be no contagion from the subprime credit debacle. Not to be outdone, former Treasury Secretary Paulson affirmed this view in August while on a trip to China. This is not Monday morning quarterbacking on my part since these conclusions were detailed in my shareholder letters as well as in my June 2007 speech, “Absence of Fear,” that I gave here in Chicago to the local chapter of the CFA Society. At FPA, we also wrote extensively on the growing bubble in the stock market in 1999 and 2000 and said that valuations were far in excess of those that preceded the 1929 crash.

Why am I detailing these errors in analysis or judgment? It is because of the extraordinary actions and policies that have been implemented by the Fed, Treasury, the Congress and the Executive branch to address this credit and economic crisis. Let me make my viewpoint perfectly clear, my trust has been severely shaken in the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the Congress and the Executive branch of government in their collective judgment as to what is required and appropriate for a fundamentally sound long-term economic recovery. Incorrect analysis, obfuscation and political posturing have brought me to this realization. Since the beginning of this credit crisis, both the Fed and Treasury have assumed that a collapse in available liquidity was its cause. At FPA, we concluded it was a capital destruction crisis and that the supply curve of credit in the U.S. had shifted to the left with the demise of the structured-finance market. We also believed that overly optimistic business plans for both depository and non-depository financial institutions had further compromised their balance sheets. Many of these institutions were acting like hedge funds, in disguise, as my associate, Steven Romick, so eloquently detailed in his December 31, 2006 FPA Crescent Fund shareholder letter.

The regulatory agencies and the federal government were complicit in laying the groundwork that allowed many of these credit excesses to develop prior to this economic crisis. Had they done their job effectively, the economy would not have been pushed to the brink of collapse. The “too big to fail” doctrine, that was allowed to develop over the years, reduced the number of viable regulatory options available to deal with this crisis. Given this history of laxity, I am dubious of the federal government’s ability to properly identify and prescribe the appropriate economic and regulatory responses. As we noted in our July 30, 2008 website commentary, “Disgusted and Betrayed,” “It was only on July 10th that Secretary Paulson said that ‘the lenders (Fannie and Freddie) have sufficient funds’ before the House Financial Services Committee. On that same day, the Office of Federal Enterprise Oversight, which regulates both Fannie and Freddie, said that ‘both are adequately capitalized.’ Finally, Senator Chris Dodd in a July 11 news conference said, ‘These institutions are sound. They have adequate capital. They have access to that capital.’” On September 7, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency announced the decision to place both of these institutions into a conservatorship that resulted in the debt and mortgage-backed securities being effectively guaranteed by the U.S. government. The Office of Management and Budget now projects that they will need an additional $92.2 billion by September 30 and this is supplementary to the $78.8 billion already received. Both companies have an emergency capital commitment from the Treasury for $200 billion each. For years we were told these agencies were private companies with only limited access to the Federal government’s balance sheet. We clearly must exercise extreme caution and skepticism when listening to our government officials.

At FPA, we fundamentally disagree with these “rescue” programs since we believe our impaired financial system is being distorted by protecting inefficient and questionable business enterprises. These programs reflect a philosophy of DWIT—Do Whatever It Takes—to stabilize the economy now. Maybe I should call it DimWit? In my opinion, a perfect example of unwise policy has been the economic support of the automotive industry, especially GMAC. At the end of last year, the U.S. Treasury invested $5 billion in GMAC senior preferred equity with an 8% yield. These new funds allowed the company to resume auto lending to support the sale of GM cars. With an 8% cost of capital, new loans were made with rates as low as zero percent. FICO scores were also lowered from 700 to 621, just one point above what would be considered a sub-prime loan. Aggressive lending practices like these are what got GMAC into this mess in the first place. This illustrates how a policy that is meant to help may actually have an unintended consequence that undermines the competitive capability of a more prudent lending institution.

Misguided measures to re-stimulate consumer borrowing, beyond just getting the system functioning, are highly questionable. The combined collapses of stocks and housing prices have pummeled the U.S. household’s net worth by an estimated $12.7 trillion, according to the Federal Reserve, while ISI International estimates it to be in the area of $14 trillion. This net worth destruction is the most severe since the Great Depression. We have a news flash for the government, creating new credit programs for a consumer who was spending almost $1.1 trillion more than they were earning in spendable income, according to MacroMaven’s estimate, will be a non-starter. More leverage is not what they need. Encouraging the consumer to take on more debt is like trying to help a recovering heroin addict lessen his pain by providing him with more heroin.

A dramatic rise in the U.S. personal savings rate will be required to begin the mending process of the consumer’s balance sheet. I expect the U.S. personal savings rate will rise from 2% to 8% this year and remain at an elevated level for the foreseeable future. This process should increase savings by approximately $650 billion annually. An increase of this magnitude, in such a brief period, is unprecedented, other than during WW2, when it rose from 12% to 24% between 1941 and 1942. Assuming some earnings on this incremental savings and a partial recovery in the stock and real-estate markets, it will likely take ten years for the consumer’s net worth to return to its pre-crisis level.

Governmental programs deployed to stabilize and grow the economy appear highly risky, especially those involving an unprecedented Federal intrusion into the private capital system. They have been implemented in an ad hoc fashion with little predictability and consideration for their long-term effects upon the economy. President Obama said in his speech of January 8, 2009, “that only government can provide the short-term boost necessary to lift us from a recession this deep and severe. Only government can break the vicious cycles that are crippling our economy.” [emphasis saddeningly added by TILB] I respectfully disagree with this statement since it flies in the face of 121 years of economic history prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. During that period, economic volatility was far greater than that which we have experienced since WW2, but the economy did recover and grow, without governmental intervention, from several recessions and depressions.

I expect little bang for the buck from the latest economic stimulus plan since most, if not all, of the anticipated positive economic effects will be offset by an increase in personal savings and a reduction in U.S. exports. The plan’s focus attempts to renew personal consumption while supporting housing. Though well intentioned, in my opinion, it is based on rear view mirror analysis in that it does not consider the likelihood that we have entered a new world economic order. If the American public is willing to accept a prolonged period of expanded government spending as a percentage of GDP, possibly in the range of a mid- to high twenty percentage proportion versus a typical 19% to 21%, the U.S. economy will face an even more protracted period of substandard economic growth than it otherwise would. A more viable solution, requiring less government, would be to encourage a transformation of the economy so that exports represent a greater portion of future GDP than their current 12.9%. A shift of approximately five percentage points could possibly accomplish this transformation. As an example, rather than offering consumers an $8,000 credit to purchase a new or existing home, it would have been far more beneficial to redirect this spending to job retraining as well as stimulating employment hiring in industries that are more export oriented. With proper incentives for investment, we could unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector. Our foreign trading partners will not wait for a recovery in the U.S. consumer’s balance sheet to rekindle their own export growth. They will direct a portion of their fiscal spending into new areas that enhance domestic economic growth, thus, reducing their export dependency. We should not be wasting precious financial resources on industries like housing and autos that will not be beneficiaries of this new trend.

My confidence is being undermined by this new financial system and era. The House of Representatives responded to the voices of the mob, when it voted 328 to 93, to punitively tax AIG employees in an ex post facto fashion. Many of these employees committed to aid in AIG’s corporate restructuring and expected their employment contracts to be honored. Another example is the repeated attempts by Congress to pass cram down legislation that would allow a first mortgage to be restructured in bankruptcy court. We placed a halt on the purchase of new mortgage-backed securities until this issue is settled. On May 6, the Senate passed safe-harbor mortgage legislation that would limit or prevent mortgage servicers from being sued, should they modify loans under government anti-foreclosure initiatives, by owners of mortgage-backed securities. We smell conflict of interest here since the five largest residential mortgage servicers, who control approximately 67% of this industry, are large recipients of TARP funds. They own billions in second mortgages and home equity loans whose values could be enhanced, if only the first mortgages are restructured; thereby, giving priority to a junior creditor’s standing.

Chrysler’s bankruptcy reveals further conflicts of interest. The four largest senior secured lenders to the company had previously received $90 billion in TARP money. It looks as though they rolled over to allow the President’s plan to move forward. To see junior creditors gain superiority over senior creditors is a bad precedent. It turns upside down the absolute priority rule that is a basis of bankruptcy law. Given this outcome, this new potential political interference risk raises a serious issue in our minds in lending to corporations with high union workforce representation with large legacy employee liabilities. At the very minimum, we will require a higher return to compensate us for this risk. It is all about the sanctity of contract in bankruptcy. As a side note, it was not the hedge funds that forced Chrysler into bankruptcy, it was the company and its unions that created a non-competitive enterprise that drove it down the road to bankruptcy. In a recent WSJ article, an unnamed administration official is quoted as saying, “You don’t need banks and bondholders to make cars.” 6 Such statements do not instill confidence in capital suppliers. The latest GM settlement proposal extends this adverse trend. Mr. President, you may have won these battles but the true cost of your “wins” will not be known for several years. Your mission to save a few thousand automotive jobs upends a history of prioritization of lender claims in bankruptcy. You are placing at risk fundamental elements of contract law. In the long run, your strategy will likely cost this country dearly. For the record, I do not, and have not, had any domestic automotive company debt in my bond fund for two decades and thus, I have no conflict of interest on this topic.

The President talks about the concept of “sacrifice” in connection with the Chrysler bankruptcy and the economic crisis. We do not see it demonstrated by our elected officials. My associate, Steven Romick, highlights in his latest shareholder letter that, “Congress recently gave themselves a 2.8% pay raise. We would have preferred something more akin to FDR’s first 100 days when he cut $100 million, including a 5.6% reduction in congressional wages, as part of “A Bill to Maintain the Credit of the United States Government.” 7 Private sector employees and business owners have suffered cuts in their incomes and profits so why should not our elected representatives and other governmental employees experience this pain as well? Why shouldn’t they sacrifice too?

We have to be careful about what is meant by “sacrifice.” As Alexis de Tocqueville said, “A democratic government is the only one in which those who vote for a tax can escape the obligation to pay it.” Given the extreme progressivity of the U.S. tax code, a small proportion of Americans are the ones who really pay for government but most Americans fail to realize it. According to the WSJ editorial of April 13, 2009, by Ari Fleischer, “Everyone Should Pay Income Taxes,” he states that the Congressional Budget Office estimates that those who earned less than $44,300 in 2001, approximately 60% of the country, paid 3.3% of all the taxes, and that by 2005 their payments had fallen to less than 1%.” This is not a healthy trend, if our democracy is to survive.

This brings me to my last point in this tirade against our federal government and its unsound policies and that is that our federal debt growth is out of control. In my September 2008 shareholder letter, I estimated that incremental new Treasury debt issuance for 2009 could be in the range of $2.5 to $3 trillion on a base of $10 trillion. For the six-month period ended March 31, 2009, Treasury debt outstanding grew by $1.1 trillion. New programs announced by the Treasury, the Fed and a much larger budget deficit total approximately $3 trillion more than my initial estimate range; thus, I believe my forecast will prove to be sadly optimistic. I also believe we will see follow on programs that will add to this total.

I estimate that by the close of 2011, Treasury debt outstanding will be between $14.6 and $16.6 trillion and that the U.S. debt to GDP ratio will rise to between 97% and 110%. By comparison, the highest ratio ever attained was 121% at the end of WW2. Furthermore, my estimates do not include entitlement liabilities or the effective guarantee of trillions of dollars of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac obligations. Treasury debt service will likely rise by 50% to 100% above the present $450 billion rate and this is with interest rate levels near record lows. A critical question is, “How do we finance all this debt?” Assuming consumers save an additional $650 billion in 2009, we will still be more dependent on foreign sources of financing. Should foreign investors retain their present amount of Treasury debt ownership and then let it increase proportionally to our debt growth this year, additional purchases between $719 and $862 billion are required versus last year’s $724 billion. This appears doubtful, given the deterioration in their domestic economies along with rapidly declining exports. To make up the difference, the Fed will be forced to print an additional $800 billion to $1.5 trillion of new money to buy these bonds. Unless Americans increase their personal savings per my estimates and foreign investors boost their Treasury ownership by 39% to 57% between 2009 and 2011, the Fed could be forced to print additional money. This possibility may unnerve some of our trading partners, particularly the Chinese and the oil exporting countries.

Restricting debt growth will be difficult, if not impossible to do since it will require the Congress making unpopular decisions while unemployment remains elevated. In a similar fashion, the Fed will find it tricky to retract the excess liquidity it has created as well as eliminating the various asset purchases and guarantee programs it has established. I do not have confidence in the government’s ability to execute these policies, given the history of the regulators, the Congress and the Executive branch choosing to ignore the excessive growth that took place at both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while looking the other way on numerous other financial institutions, including AIG and the investment brokerage firms. For over three years, Fannie and Freddie operated with excessive leverage and without public financial statements while the government twiddled its thumbs. In contrast, FPA saw these problems three years ago and made the difficult decision to place all of these companies on its investment restricted list. We would not reward bad behavior. I do not see government rising to our standard.

What gets me is that this outrageous size and continued growth in debt and off balance sheet entitlement liabilities is effectively stealing from our children and future generations. As Thomas Jefferson said, “Loading up the nation with debt and leaving it for the following generations to pay is morally irresponsible” and “To preserve independence, we must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt.” These sentiments ring true today except with our elected representatives. Who is to blame for this tragic set of circumstances? We are. If we, as citizens and providers of capital, do not attempt to exert control and discipline over our government, who will? At FPA, we will not lend long-term money to this irresponsible and fiscally inept government nor will we to other irresponsible borrowers. We are exercising nothing less than our fiduciary responsibility.

Outlook
My financial market outlook is rather cautious. I believe the recent stock market rally is nothing more than a bear market rally. It is being driven by some highly optimistic expectations. A narrowing in credit spreads is encouraging some “experts” to express the view that the worst of the credit crisis is over, especially with the economic stimulus plan benefits yet to come. Many economists are forecasting an end to the recession by year end, and I have even seen one anticipating a “V” shaped recovery. If my previous comments about the stimulus plan prove to be correct, these forecasts will be wrong. With a continuing weak economy, particularly among consumers, corporate earnings growth will disappoint. Over the last four years at FPA, we have argued that both reported corporate profits and profit margins were unsustainably high. This assessment has proven to be correct for financial-service companies and now we believe this process is extending to non-financial corporations. We estimate that at their peak, corporate profit margins were approximately 30% higher than previous peaks. With a return to more normal profit margins and substandard economic growth, I expect the stock market to be price constrained for the next ten years. This analysis tends to support my estimate that it may also take ten years for U.S. consumers to rebuild their balance sheets.

The fixed-income market faces many challenges that include an explosion in Treasury debt issuance and a return of energy price inflation, within three to five years. In light of this, FPA New Income’s portfolio remains defensively postured, with a short duration that has averaged approximately one year or less for the past six years. I view the Treasury market as being in bubble territory with foolish leaders at the helm of our economic ship.

It appears that we have seen the worst of this credit crisis in the sense that we went over a waterfall but the river is still flowing south. The bulk of the economy’s credit problems are still to come, as charge-offs on trillions of dollars in loans remain to be recognized.

The credit markets are gradually reopening but they are still supported by massive federal programs and guarantees. We do not know the costs of these actions that will have to be paid by future generations of Americans. In the short run, the 1979 Chrysler bailout looked like a winner, but from a longer term viewpoint, did we accomplish anything? Government economic interference can and will cause a price to be paid; hopefully, it will not be a large one, but I doubt it. We are in the midst of a Grand Experiment that entails high risk while the nation is in its most leveraged position in history. There is little margin for error.

Closing
It is my hope that I have provided you with some new insights and have prompted you to consider how your actions or inactions could personally affect the financial risks facing our country. I believe this crisis has reawakened a sense of budgetary responsibility that has lain dormant in Americans these past two decades. As Americans, we should demand the same of our government. We, as an industry that allocates capital, bear a responsibility to compel our government leaders to return to prudent fiscal management. If they do not, long-term capital should be withheld, as we have done at FPA for the past six years. We must demand this of our elected representatives and if they do not adhere to a strict fiscal discipline, they should be kicked out of office. If we fail at this responsibility, I fear our nation will travel down a dark and treacherous road.

Thank you again Morningstar for giving me this opportunity to share some opinions and insights at this conference.


Happy green shoots to you, kind TILB reader!

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Let TILB know what you think.

Monday, June 08, 2009

The Boston Globe's Union Employees Reject Contract Proposal; Imperil The Globe's Future

The future of the struggling Boston Globe was put in doubt today after the writers' guild rejected The Globe's latest and allegedly final contract proposal. Seven votes was the difference (the vote was 277 to 265 which means if seven voters flipflopped, the proposal would have passed).

The parent company (The NY Times Co.) immediately and unilaterally imposed a 23% wage and benefit cut. That will of course be challenged and arbitrated but The Globe says it's either that or shut down.
Link to The Globe's story on The Globe

It seems that blogs plus a few truly national resources may in fact be the last, best hope for investigative media.

At this point, the writers are staring down the barrel of either bankrupting their employer (but hey, as the Chrysler traveshammockery showed them, perhaps they'll end up owning the company - controlling the media seems like a nice option for The Borg, I mean The Administration to go). They cannot strike or else the paper certainly goes belly-up, so a multi-year arbitration process or a negotiated settlement (not likely from The Times standpoint, I suspect) are the most viable options.

This is all kind of sad but fascinating at the same time.

Reports of Krugman's Capitulation Premature

We at TILB are fans of BTIG's Mike O'Rourke. While we often disagree with his views or conclusions, we respect that he represents the thoughtful voice of The Trader. He provides a nice intersection between technicals and the trading interpretation of the news of the day.

Well, today Mike did a little more digging on the Bloomberg.com Krugman piece widely cited by the blogosphere as proof that Paul capitulated on his non-green shoots stance. Mike found that the content of Krugman's speech in fact continued to promote Krugman's view that a Japan outcome is an upside scenario for The U.S.

O'Rourke's words follow (excerpted from his nightly Bedtime with BTIG distribution):

It was astounding to see the headlines and comment from Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman at the London School of Economics, “I would not be surprised if the official end of the U.S. recession ends up being, in retrospect, dated sometime this summer.” This is the same economist who, three months ago, was an ardent proponent of a $1.4 Trillion stimulus and co-head of the group in favor of nationalizing the banking system. He was at the extreme end of the spectrum with respect to the size of the stimulus, and while he had ample company in the nationalization camp, that is not a stance one should take lightly. Did he really have a radical change of heart? Not likely. We found it hard to believe that he would reverse positions and be even more optimistic than we are so we watched the lecture in its entirety. What was widely missed across all of the headlines and reporting was Krugman’s following statement a few lines later, “There is a lot of reason to think that this is going to go, that the world economy is going to stay depressed for an extended period. In fact, as I said at the beginning, the Japanese lost decade is actually starting to look good in terms of depth right now, it was not nearly as deep as what we are going through and I am actually worried that it will start to look good in terms of duration as well.” Krugman is speaking again in the next few days so do not expect those headlines to be quite so positive. Evidently, he had to acknowledge that some aspects of the economic data are better than expected, but he is still clearly in the mindset of “Depression Economics."

Levered Fund of Funds Go The Way Of The Dodo - Delevering Continues Happily Plodding Along

HSBC today announces that they will stop providing financing for levered fund of funds. Deleveraging continues. Everything is fine at HSBC though, don't worry. Some pertinent sections from a Bloomberg article:
June 8 (Bloomberg) -- HSBC Holdings Plc’s U.S. securities division will no longer extend structured financing to hedge- fund investors to leverage their investments, according to people familiar with the company’s plans.

The bank is halting the financing by its structured-funds products division and eliminating an unspecified number of jobs in New York, said one of the people, who asked not to be identified because the information hasn’t been made public. The group reports to Steven Phan, global head of the investment access and solutions groups in London, the person said. Phan declined to comment.

“Hedge fund-linked strategies tie up a lot of capital because of the illiquidity of the underlying hedge fund,” said Keith Styrcula, chairman of the Structured Products Association, a New York-based industry group. “Those were among the very first lines of business that firms were cutting back on.”

Re-default Rate For Modified Resi Mortgages

JP Morgan put together a helpful overview of re-default (or "recidivism" as many insiders prefer to call it) rates by modification type. Not surprisingly, given the way most Americans manage their finances (month to month), the most effective form of modification is to reduce monthly payments. Loan forgiveness (basically reducing the outstanding balance on the mortgage) is the second most effective method.

In every scenario, a huge portion of modified mortgages re-default, generally within the first six months of the mod.

One of the points not mentioned, but which I think is worth noting, is that loan mods really only began in earnest last summer and, as such, the dataset is still very young. Certain kinds of loan mods (like loan forgiveness) are even newer efforts, at least in scale. So all of the recidivism rates are likely to keep rising simply as a result of time passing allowing for more re-defaults.

This is based on data that JP Morgan pulled together from the Loan Performance database on the Loan Performance database.

Here's what the JP Morgan analyst said about the analysis:

Moving on to the subject of re-default, we note that the overall re-default rate stands at 40%. Breaking that number out by modification methods, we observe that capitalization has the highest re-default rate of 54%, and rate reduction the lowest of 24%. Also, the more severe the starting delinquency status before modification, the higher the re-default rate (Table 7). Despite rate reductions seemingly being more effective than principal forgiveness in terms of re-defaults, we note that lowering the balance of a mortgage through a modification by 20% or more results in a re-default rate of 32%, compared to 43% when the balance is increased (mainly due to capitalization)—i.e., balance modifications impact redefault rates.

There also seems to be a strong correlation between monthly payment amounts and re-defaults (Table 6), reaching from 26% of modified borrowers re-defaulting when their payment drops by 30% or more, to 59% redefaulting when the payment increases. Given the mechanics of capitalization (delinquent amount is added to the loan balance and the loan is re-amortized resulting in higher payments) and the high re-default rates with an increase in monthly payment, it is obvious that the payment increase is the main driver for high re-default rates when capitalization is applied. Therefore the combination of capitalization and rate reduction, which results in an unchanged or decreased monthly payment 94% of the time and a re-default rate of 41%, is much more effective than just capitalization with a 54% redefault rate. Additionally, 66% of re-defaults happen within six months after modification. We think a 40% re-default rate for modified loans is reasonable going forward.
Re Default Rate

Friday, June 05, 2009

SHOCKER! U.S. Treasury (I Mean "God") Forced Chrysler Into Fiat's Hands

The WSJ is on fire today (see TILB's recent post on the slap fest between The Sheila Bear and The Panda Bear).

They are now reporting internal emails that disclose a juicy back and forth between The Administration and Chrysler. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is perfectly consistent with our Grand Unified Conspiracy Theory.

Click here to read some of the source document emails.

So, let's see:
  • Chrysler has unanswered worries about Fiat's health;

  • Fiat basically would not cooperate with Chrysler's efforts at due diligence. In fact, a mere "eight days before President Barack Obama announced his support for the alliance in an April 30 speech, Chrysler officials were still bristling over what they considered Fiat's unwillingness to provide even basic information about its finances";

  • Chrysler executives referred to The U.S. Treasury as "God" in email (perhaps TILB's Borg references are more accurate than many people think);

  • The appeals process, which has been railroaded, still ended with this great CYA quote from one of the appellate court judges, "[the Supreme Court should have] a swing at this ball."

  • Government lawyers are now referring to dissident lawyer Tom Lauria as a "terrorist"

  • Nardelli confirmed Fiat's role as playing a core piece in our Grand Unified Conspiracy Theory when he worried "that the introduction of Fiat in the U.S. 'may have a negative impact' on General Motors and Ford." [shocker]

  • Chrysler advisory team members openly worried that "'Treasury/Chrysler' was 'in bed with a shady partner [Fiat].'"

  • And, finally, we learn that Chrysler's advisor from Capstone struggles to master even the very basics of English. This gem says it all, "These washington guys want to show the market (gm, delphi....) that they can be tuff. We are the gueni pigs unfortunately."

This is all very sad. Further proof that the entire Chrysler "process" was nothing but a traveshammockery.

FDIC Pushing To Purge Citi Management; Lower Its Health Rating

What follows is from an honest to goodness fantastical piece of reporting by The Wall Street Journal.

The WSJ is reporting that the FDIC is pushing to have The Panda Bear - Vik Pandit - and other Citi management replaced. Further, it seems like the FDIC was a nut hair from putting Citi on its list of Problem Banks at the end of March, but was convinced to hold off by the OCC.

Citi management responded to Sheila's endeavors by stoking the fire with a reply that basically kicks The Sheila Bear (Sheila Bair) directly in her giant balls:

"The FDIC is our tertiary regulator," behind the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, said Ned Kelly, Citigroup's chief financial officer.

Sure.

The same Tertiary Regulator that has to deal with your sorry ass(ets) when you fail? The same Tertiary Regulator that has already entered a $300 billion loss sharing agreement with you and has guaranteed $40 billion of your debt? Oh, and, by the way, the U.S. Treasury owns (or is about to own) 34% of you. I mean, why should the FDIC have any influence? What do they care? Those kooky FDIC bastards.

Keep swinging, Ned.

Apparently Ned is not the only one wailing at Sheila with gorgeous pedicured hands. The cat fight between The Panda Bear and The Sheila Bear actually dates back to The Sheila Bear's deep sixing of Citi's agreement to take over Wachovia. Here is how the WSJ presents the gossip:

The discord between Citigroup and the FDIC dates to last fall. In September, Citigroup agreed to buy faltering Wachovia Corp. in a government-arranged marriage. Days later, however, Wells Fargo & Co. swept in with a higher offer for Wachovia. Citigroup officials felt blindsided and faulted Ms. Bair for endorsing the Wells Fargo bid over their own.

On a 2 a.m. conference call at that time, the usually mild-mannered Mr. Pandit launched into an obscenity-laced tirade about the FDIC chairman, according to people familiar with the call.

Citigroup soon filed lawsuits against Wells Fargo and Wachovia, accusing them of improperly breaking up the Citigroup deal. Citigroup executives came to blame the deal's demise as the catalyst for a plunge in Citigroup's stock price, one cause of the federal bailouts.

Repairing Relations
After months of not talking to the agency, Citigroup executives in the past couple of months have tried to repair relations with the FDIC.

Board members including Mr. Parsons, the new chairman, have reached out to FDIC officials, according to people familiar with the matter. Their message: "We're here to help," one person said. "Please use us as your avenue. We want to facilitate your review of Citi."

In public statements, Ms. Bair has declined to discuss Citigroup.

In private conversations with other regulators, FDIC officials have argued the government should be tougher on Citigroup. In what is becoming a classic Washington turf battle, the Comptroller of the Currency has countered that replacing the bank's management could be too disruptive. The agency, which oversees Citigroup's national bank division, believes Citigroup needs more time to implement its turnaround strategy.

In March, senior officials from the FDIC and Comptoller sparred over the confidential financial-health rating the government assigns to the company's Citibank unit, people familiar with the matter said. The FDIC wanted the rating lowered, these people say. Banks rated a 4 or 5, on a scale of 1 to 5, are deemed "problem banks," which means they're at greater risk of failure.

Government officials decided to keep Citigroup off the "problem" list at the end of March, which became clear after the FDIC disclosed that the 305 banks on the anonymous list had a total of only $220 billion in assets, meaning Citi couldn't be among them.

Still, Citigroup officials believe that the FDIC will push them onto the "problem" list if they don't remove Mr. Pandit and his team. They fear being on the list could limit Citigroup's access to federal programs and prompt trading partners and clients to yank business. [emphasis added]
As a brief aside, small banks must love the Orwellian sense of equality The Borg, I mean, The Administration provides.

Anyone want to place odds that The Shelia Bear was a primary source for this story? The Panda Bear is probably chewing on some bamboo, just pissed as all hell right now. This article has all the hallmarks of "anonymous backstabbing media leak in order to execute a personal vendetta" written all over it.

We at TILB couldn't be more pleased.

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Let us know what you think? Can a Sheila Bear beat a Panda Bear in a mud wrestling match?

Sixth Illinois Based Bank Failure of 2009 (6 out of 37!)

Another Illinois bank eats it.

Third in three weeks, I believe.

The FDIC expects $83 mm of losses on $214 mm of "assets." That's just a horrific loss percentage at 39%.

Think about that for a second: at best, the $214 mm of reported assets is actually worth $133 million. Things seem to be getting worse and worse from the perspective of what the reported assets of these banks are worth. Doesn't give me much confidence in the reported balance sheets of the big banks.

As of May 26, 2009, Bank of Lincolnwood had total assets of approximately
$214 million and total deposits of $202 million. Republic Bank of Chicago agreed
to purchase approximately $162 million in assets. The FDIC will retain the
remaining assets for later disposition.
....
The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund will be $83
million. Republic Bank of Chicago's acquisition of all the deposits was the
"least costly" resolution for the DIF compared to alternatives. Bank of
Lincolnwood is the 37th FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year
and the sixth in Illinois. The last bank to fail in the state was Citizens
National Bank, Macomb, on May 22, 2009.

The Grand Unified Conspiracy Theory - Part I

We here at TILB have been referring to our Grand Unified Conspiracy Theory for well over a month now. What follows is the first in a two part series on The Grand Unified Conspiracy Theory. Part I outlines The Theory. Part II will show its applicability to nearly every government intervention to date.

As previously discussed on TILB, many of the governmental actions to date have the strange feeling of a coordinated effort to disembowel corporate America while burking free will into its perverted death throes.

Some may say it seems harsh to label this ugly trend a "conspiracy," yet it has many of the classic hallmarks. As Kurt Cobain said, sometime before hollowing out his head, "just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you." While conspiratorial path began under President Bush, it has accelerated at a sickening pace under President Obama.

As with all conspiracies, the ability to decipher the actions begins with understanding the end goal.

We believe the goal is simple: control cash flows and direct them as desired to gain political ends. Whether or not it's a full fledged conspiracy, that goal seems obviously applicable and deceitful enough to create discomfort.

Working from the end forward, if we were conspiring to accomplish the aforementioned goal, we would want to do it in the least overt manner possible so as to maintain plausible deniability.

So the Chavez/Venezuela model, despite its appeal to ill-minded politicians, fails the basic sniff test of the average American and would be difficult to employ in The States. While that overt model meets the end goal, it does not fly in America, so we have to look for a path with lower resistance.

What if, rather than simply taking assets from owners against their will, we actually set up a structure that caused those owners to willfully surrender to our control?

That would seem to be the ideal.

As the legendary algebrist Jacobi is famed for saying, the secret to problem solving is to "invert, always invert." So, with our understanding of the end desires and a method that would work in America (get them to willfully give you their assets) well in mind, we can begin to imagine a means of accomplishing the goal:


1) Identify a big industry that is suffering from weakness, ideally a cyclical or temporary weakness. A lot of debt would be helpful as well. One final condition is key: many industry players need to be suffering from some weakness, not just one particularly poor player;

2) Identify the weakest sizeable player;

3) Deem that player "too important to fail" due to traits that are easily deliverable by the media and easily consumed by Joe Sixpack (e.g., "huge employer", statements of "systemic importance" such as "its collapse would cause the collapse of others", etc.);

4) Once we reach the brink of that important-but-weak company's collapse, step in as a funding provider of last resort in exchange for dominating control;

5) Prop up the failed company (FailedCo), disallowing its failure in a traditional sense thus preventing its competitors from absorbing the marketshare that would have been forfeit by FailedCo. This marketshare grab would have improved the health of all the remaining players but instead the opposite happens because...

6) ...the government, lacking a natural profit motive and supported by a theoretically infinite funding supply (a printing press and taxing authority), will operate FailedCo without a particularly profit driven motive. These non-economic behaviors harm competitors. Running the business in this manner will be easily justified with statements such as, "we need to ensure that FailedCo continues to operate at scale so that when we sell it back to private hands it generates enough proceeds to payback tax payers" or "we are not in the business of laying people off. We want to maintain the corpus of FailedCo until we find a permanent home for it." Countervailing voices can easily be surpressed with the mantra that they are greedy capitalists trying to benefit from the pain of the Average American.

7) In a world without interference in the markets when FailedCo actually failed, the competitors would have been strengthened in two ways: 1) marketshare grab from the disappearance or absorption of FailedCo; and 2) improved pricing as the surviving companies all endeavor to rebuild their balance sheets. However, in the conspiracy world, these participants continue to weaken as they compete with an overwhelmingly funded, non-economic competitor. This leads to the failure of the next weakest competitor (NextCo);

8) NextCo voluntarily comes to the government for its own bailout.

9) Rinse and repeat.
The process of having the government compete with private capital without a classic return-driven framework means that it will pound already weakened competitors into capitulation and these competitors will actually come to the government of their own volition for bailout, helping to further consolidate the government's power and control over cash flows.

This is elegant because most people will not be able to understand or simply will not believe the cause and effect.

While it has the exact same end game as simply nationalizing companies against their will (ala Chavez), it accomplishes that outcome in an obfuscated and seemingly voluntary manner.

Some people may say, "hey, TTB, that's ridiculous. Get off the Crazy Train."

In Part II of The Grand Unified Conspiracy Threory, we will address our sanity by walking through virtually every governmental interference in private companies and show its applicability.

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Let us know what you think? Are we crazy? If so, like a fox, or like a crazy person? If the latter, like John Nash or Kurt Cobain? If Kurt Cobain, like him before or after he off'd himself?

Wednesday, June 03, 2009

Moving Weights From Left Pocket To Right Pocket May Decrease Weight

In a NY Times article posted online today titled "Rising Interest on Nations’ Debts May Sap World Growth" a classic anti-Bastiat mistake is made. Somehow the headline author seems to believe that if countries pay more interest, the world will grow slower, as if the extra interest payments are remitted by these nations into an incinerator.

Of course, common sense tells us that that interest will go to lenders and the lenders will choose how to spend it as opposed to the debtor nation. This of course has no discernible impact on world growth (and may be a net plus as, on the margin, it takes spending decisions out of the hands of governments and puts it into more efficient private hands) though it may certainly depress the remitting country's growth (depending on where their interest payments flow to).

The article addresses a point made by TILB just last week when we wrote:
To date, nearly all of those symptoms have manifested in one way or another, but we believe the most damning symptom could be the first: if the Fed does indeed lose control of long bond yields, watch out.

The yield curve on any term longer than a few years has backed up a huge amount in the last few weeks. In fact, with the Fed's ZIRP still firmly in place, the 2s/10s spread has widened out to record width, surpassing Greenspan's early 90s gift to banks (please always keep in mind that is a taxpayer subsidy). From the Fed's perspective, the danger of long bond yields rising is that it has the potential to unwind a great deal of their efforts to improve credit conditions for term borrowers, especially home buyers/refi'ers.

Further, the back-up in rates will make it increasingly expensive for the Treasury to term out We The People's debt. For example, the party-agnostic CBO uses an average 3.0% Ten Year Treasury Note Rate for 2009 and 3.2% for 2010 for budgeting purposes (see PDF page 52 here - note they also are far too optimistic on tax receipts due to their delusional GDP and unemployment assumptions, which we've already blown past). With the 10 Year having backed up 100bps in the past two weeks to 3.61%, we are already in the process of blowing the CBO's budget (the 30 Year has similarly moved to 4.49%). It's worth noting that the 2s/10s spread is wide today not because of absolutely high 10s but because of artificially low 2s (due to the Fed's ZIRP). [data as of 5/27/09 close]

So that is the precipice. If longer rates continue to move up on the back of the enormous supply ($2 trillion deficit likely this year, as we predicted back in January when most people thought $1 trillion was likely), then the government will have three choices:
1) continue to issue the already planned volume of longer bonds at higher rates and blow through budget projections resulting in yet more debt needing to be issued and enduring a further credibility hit;
2) monetize the debt by having the Fed step in as a buyer of unlimited volume at a pre-determined level (say 3.5% on the 10s) and risk rapid debasement of the dollar; or
3) move down the curve toward the short end where rates are cheaper but take on roll risk of epic proportions.

My guess is some combination of All of The Above with a lean toward #1 and/or #2.

This is either Custer's last stand and we are about to be ambushed or it's a beautifully executed rear guard gambit by our Fed and Treasury, maintaining a strong-enough dollar while financing the deficit and arresting a credit crisis all at once.

My suspicion is the former.

If I am correct, there is a serious potential for all hell to break loose in the next year as the dollar gets obliterated from a purchasing power standpoint putting the Fed in one hell of a bind. They either deal with the dollar's weakness by tightening - which may precipitate a financial panic and prove Bernanke a liar for his apology to Milton Friedman - or they actively debase, calling into question the dollar's reserve currency status, punishing savers to help borrowers, and setting loose the inflation to end all inflations...which of course will ultimately force them to tighten.

In essence, under either scenario the Fed will have to tighten against their preferred policy. It is simply a question of when they do it and what type of pain we are interested in taking between now and then. Admittedly, this is not an attractive set of choices. I do not begrudge Bernanke his roll in history.
This of course all seems obvious when you think about it, but what's shocking is that so little attention is directed toward it.

In any case, TILB Kenneth Rogoff is quoted in the aforementioned NY Times article (see below, heavily edited):
As governments worldwide try to spend their way out of recession, many countries are finding themselves in the same situation as embattled consumers: paying higher interest rates on their rapidly expanding debt.

Increased rates could translate into hundreds of billions of dollars more in government spending for countries like the United States, Britain and Germany.

Even a single percentage point increase could cost the Treasury an additional $50 billion annually over a few years — and, eventually, an additional $170 billion annually.

This could put unprecedented pressure on other government spending, including social programs and military spending, while also sapping economic growth by forcing up rates on debt held by companies, homeowners and consumers.
...
But in the last three weeks, the pace of the increase in the 10-year Treasury note’s yield has quickened, spurred by a Congressional Budget Office estimate that net government debt will rise to 65 percent of the gross domestic product at the end of fiscal 2010, from 41 percent at the end of fiscal 2008.

In 2009 and 2010, Washington will sell more than $5 trillion in new debt, according to Citigroup. A decade from now, according to the Congressional Budget office, Washington’s outstanding debt could equal 82 percent of G.D.P., or just over $17 trillion.
...
Under President Obama’s 2010 budget, total interest payments by the federal government could rise to $806 billion in 2019, from $170 billion this year, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Much of that projected increase is a result of higher government borrowing, but the forecast also assumes that the average 10-year note yield will increase to 4.7 percent.
...
“It’s a gigantic issue,” said Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor and the co-author of a forthcoming book, “This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.” “It leaves us very vulnerable to a global rise in interest rates that might be substantially beyond our control.”

Mr. Rogoff estimates that if the budget office’s debt estimate proves correct, every one percentage point increase in rates could eventually cost Washington an added $170 billion a year.
...
A year ago, under old budget and policy assumptions and before the financial crisis escalated, the Congressional Budget Office projected that outstanding federal debt would hit $5.3 trillion in 10 years.

“It’s an exaggeration of course, but it’s a little like what happened to the subprime borrowers,” Mr. Rogoff said. “People are just assuming the funding will always be there.”
...
Britain’s debt sales might seem less alarming than the multitrillion-dollar offerings from the euro zone and the United States. But Mark D. Schofield, global head of interest rate strategy at Citigroup in London, said, “It’s a huge increase in percentage terms, and it dwarfs anything else.”

Standard & Poor’s caught some traders and investors off-guard last month when it warned that Britain’s sovereign debt was in danger of losing its AAA rating, lowering the outlook to negative from stable. It was the first time since Standard & Poor’s initiated coverage of British debt in 1978 that the country received a negative outlook.

Britain’s government debt now equals 55 percent of G.D.P., but Standard and Poor’s estimates it could approach 100 percent by 2013.
...

PPIP Put On Hold

Shockingly, banks are not lined up to voluntarily sell their "toxic" (i.e., worth something less than par) assets, lest their balance sheets begin to reflect economic truth.

The truth would be unacceptable.

Or, as a friend of TILB so succinctly put it, "Amazing. You give a Trillion dollars to banks and suspend MTM, and they don't want to sell? That's a head scratcher."

Indeed.

That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen:
In addition, if you were a bank why on Earth would you sell when We The People are willing to subsidize your balance sheet via one of the steepest curves in history (on top of wide spreads!)?

In fact, not only have we subsidized your past (balance sheet injections) and obfuscated your current state to your benefit (MTM), we fully intend to subsidize your future (steep curve, zero funding costs, gifted trading profits).

In essence, the government has licensed the banking system a money printing machine. Of course, private industry does not have an actual money printing machine (and if it did, it would still lead to wealth theft from savers). Rather, the money being "printed" by bank profitability is actually the collection of the profitability excretion that results from the forced consumption of a massive ex-lax that was jammed down the throat of the rest of the economic system. To the extent the Fist of Government has granted super-normal future profitability to the banking system, you can rest peacefully at night knowing that other parts of the economy are paying for it - just stay close to the shitter.

So, as a member of the Brahman level of the corporate caste system, why would Bank XYZ sell? What's the downside? Bankruptcy? Ha! As if. Simply play the same game Ford selected and give the dice a roll; worst case scenario, you get bailed out anyway. Best case scenario, you confiscate enough profits from the rest of the economic system that you regain your swagger as a global BSD.

And thus, shockingly, the FDIC expects a supply shortage and Super SIV v5.0 is shelved along with all of its prior incarnations. Not canceled, of course, simply shelved - we must always build in an escape hatch so that we can reactivate the plan without seeming like we keep changing our mind.

In any case, here's the FDIC's release. Basically, the LLP will only function for assets from banks in conservatorship:
FDIC Statement on the Status of the Legacy Loans Program

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 3, 2009 Media Contact:
Andrew Gray (202-898-7192)


The FDIC today formally announced that development of the Legacy Loans Program (LLP) will continue, but that a previously planned pilot sale of assets by open banks will be postponed. In making the announcement, Chairman Bair stated, "Banks have been able to raise capital without having to sell bad assets through the LLP, which reflects renewed investor confidence in our banking system. As a consequence, banks and their supervisors will take additional time to assess the magnitude and timing of troubled assets sales as part of our larger efforts to strengthen the banking sector."

As a next step, the FDIC will test the funding mechanism contemplated by the LLP in a sale of receivership assets this summer. This funding mechanism draws upon concepts successfully employed by the Resolution Trust Corporation in the 1990s, which routinely assisted in the financing of asset sales through responsible use of leverage. The FDIC expects to solicit bids for this sale of receivership assets in July.

Chairman Bair added, "The FDIC will continue its work on the LLP and will be prepared to offer it in the future as an important tool to cleanse bank balance sheets and bolster their ability to support the credit needs of the economy."

###

Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence in the nation's banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation's 8,246 banks and savings associations and it promotes the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, monitoring and addressing risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no federal tax dollars – insured financial institutions fund its operations.

FDIC press releases and other information are available on the Internet at www.fdic.gov, by subscription electronically (go to www.fdic.gov/about/subscriptions/index.html) and may also be obtained through the FDIC's Public Information Center (877-275-3342 or 703-562-2200). PR-84-2009

Chrysler Losing $100 Million Per Day

Chrysler is losing $100 million per DAY? How is that even possible? Doesn't that annualize to $30+ billion
per year? Wow.

Click here for a Bloomberg article on the subject.

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Update: We've received feedback from one of TILB's gearhead friends. Fantastic retrospective on Chrysler's green shoots from just two years (at the peak):
I would say losses are directly tied to circumstance that current capacity utilization is at 40% but budgets were baked at 90%.

Which is not what executives were planning on...

Link to story below:
Chrysler sees 100 pct capacity utilization in '08
Wed Feb 14, 2007 11:36am EST

AUBURN HILLS, Mich, Feb 14 (Reuters) - Chrysler Group's DCXGn.DE Chief Executive Officer Tom LaSorda said on Wednesday he expects the company to have 100 percent production capacity utilization going in to 2008. The money-losing U.S. unit of DaimlerChrysler announced a restructuring plan earlier on Wednesday that targets a 400,000 unit reduction in production capacity and slashing of 13,000 jobs by 2009.

Tuesday, June 02, 2009

Chrysler Re-redux

After posting this reflection on the Chrysler creditor railroading Sunday, we received a follow-up email from our outsourced restructuring specialist - we'll call him Starting Tackle for giggles.

At the beginning of Sunday's reflection, TILB included a preamble that tried to put up the only possible argument we could conceive of in defense of The U.S. Treasury's sodomy of secured creditors:
I will offer the one counterpoint that I've heard to all of this that at least gives me pause. The counterpoint is that, in the end, all of the creditors accepted the re-org voluntarily (defining "voluntary" in the broadest possible sense). Further, while there has been outrage about the UAW receiving 55% of the re-org'd company as a junior creditor, they in fact did not receive 55% as a junior creditor; in essence, the U.S. Treasury received it and chose to give it to the UAW which is completely within their rights.
Starting Tackle responded to my Devil's Advocate argument with the below. It is fairly clear Starting Tackle knows more about this than we at TILB, so you should read and respect his voice.

A couple of points for [TILB] on the counterarguments that give [them] pause (I wouldn't lose sleep over them):

Not all the creditors accepted this voluntarily.

Chrysler is not a reorg, but technically a sale. As such, one must separate the interests that Treasury has/had in the Chrysler estate from the interest it will have in New Chrysler. Same goes for the UAW. The Chrysler estate and New Chrysler are separate and distinct entities. UAW doesn't get 4.6B note and 55% of the company because they were a junior creditor, or because Treasury gave the UAW a portion of their recovery from the Chrysler estate, (which as [TILB] points out, would be within their right to do). UAW gets this value because that's how "whoever" decided that New Chrysler should be capitalized. (This is the whole problem with this case - the fact that this is a "sale" and not a reorg allows for the manipulation of absolute priority because the "buyer" can capitalize itself however it chooses. The practical reality, of course, is that at these values there really is no "buyer" and so this is a sub-rosa plan that violates absolute priority.)

Under absolute priority Treasury is entitled to nothing for their third lien claim because the first lien isn't being paid out in full, to say nothing for the second lien held by Cerberus and Daimler. So Treasury can't be transferring value to the UAW based on their existing claim in the Chrysler estate - based on the purchase price being paid Treasury is an out-of-the-money creditor. That is why I said "I fail to see a contribution from the UAW that justifies receipt of a $4.6 billion note and 55% of the stock issued by New Chrysler". As far as I can tell, the UAW isn't paying dollars into New Chrysler for the note or the equity they are receiving in this deal - they just get it.

If this was a plan of reorganization, this wouldn't be allowed. Under a plan, the value of NewCo would have to follow absolute priority, or at least resemble it (since more senior creditors can take less than owed under absolute priority to buy off junior creditors and get a plan confirmed). If this was a real sale (or at least anything approaching fair value for the assets was paid), how Treasury chose to capitalize New Chrysler wouldn't be nearly as big an issue because New Chrysler would be putting fair value into the Chrysler estate in the transfer/sale of assets. That fair value would be distributed among Chrysler's creditors according to absolute priority. But because Treasury is paying so much less than FMV for the assets, the sale is really a sham and the value is just being handed to the UAW.

We will make two brief Devil's Advocate statements (everyone knows where TILB stands on this matter):

1) sure, not "all" creditors accepted this voluntarily ("voluntarily" defined in the broadest possible sense), but over 90% of secured creditors did and that is as close to "all" as can be practically hoped for; and

2) we would argue from a practical non-legal perspective, part of Starting Tackle's point is a distinction without a difference - whether The U.S. Treasury gets its shares then gives them to the UAW or simply proposes a plan that bypasses that intermediate step and simply grants the UAW its ownership without touching Treasury hands doesn't particularly matter in the end. Of course, the legal ramifications are another story as the path matters to The Law.

Now I must excuse myself; your humble author needs to go home and draw a hot bath. TILB must cleanse itself of its festering, soul destroying defense of public interference in private endeavors, even as a Devil's Advocate.

Wish me health.

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Let us know your view on Starting Tackle's take on the abrogation of contract law and its ramifications on the cost and availability of future lending!