Showing posts with label CRE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CRE. Show all posts

Sunday, November 15, 2009

The Singularity: A World Walking The Tight Rope Of Low Interest Rates

[What follows is a thought piece I spent two weeks writing and sent around to some colleagues on Sunday October 18th. It has been modified slightly to take some associate's names out. TILB believes the outcome of rising rates would be unusually horrible for risk assets and, frankly, our society in general.]

“Are you getting it? Armageddon it! Ooh, really getting it? Yes, Armageddon
it!”
- Def Leppard
We have spent a great deal of time reflecting on the lessons learned over the past two years. As I've contemplated those lessons and considered Hatch's recent point that after this recent risk-rally, it appears that market participants' behavior is seemingly unchanged, I began thinking about what we should do to prepare/adjust for the risks that remain in the world (assuming any do). I have many views about this but want to address one in particular.

Humans have a fairly well defined collective “nature” and we are all challenged to deal with our own tendencies within our nature. We have a tendency to self deceive – particularly in situations where we’ve already put ourselves out to the world as having taken a view. Among other things, we have a desire to be right, a desire to be liked, we anchor to the past – especially the recent past – and we act emotionally and generally as a herd. I suffer from all of these, especially self deception.

It's part of life.

Hopefully I have some advantage in dealing with my own tendencies simply by acknowledging them, being aware of them, and realizing that self-deception doesn’t help with my even greater desire to be right. When I frame something through those combined lenses, it helps me stop deceiving so that I can get on the side of “right”.

That’s me. But collectively it’s not possible for man to suppress its aggregate nature and so we muddle along doomed to commit the same mistakes over and over again. The mistakes may not be identical on the surface but they’re identical at their core. This reality was reinforced by Seth Klarman at a conference I saw him speak at back in 2004 or 2005 when he fielded the question (paraphrasing), "do you worry that with the rise of hedge funds and everyone looking for inefficiencies that you're not going to find fat pitches anymore; that the market has become more efficient?" with the following response, "I'm not worried that human nature has changed."

Exactly.

So what is it about human nature pre-2007 that led to the “crisis”. This doesn’t need to address the true “core” problems that I see of fiat money, fractional reserve banking, and unintended consequences of certain policy and regulatory actions. Instead, let’s look at the nature of the foundation those skewed incentives created and how those building blocks were set to crumble in the first place.

In summary, we had a lack of respect for risk, perhaps engrained from 25 years of a generally painless experience for capital (recency bias) where the speedbumps that were approached seemed to be flattened out by the all-seeing, all-knowing Federal Reserve. Howard Marks said that, "the fear of loss is to capitalism as fear of hell is to Catholicism." Collectively, our balance between fear and greed was eroded by this apparent government-gilded safety net and the scales tipped out of whack. This manifested itself in a variety of ways including too much leverage, too little diligence, too much faith in government, too much moral hazard, prices that appreciated too far above the associated intrinsic worth of the assets they represented, too much illiquidity, etc.

I think back on 2006 and remember having conversations over and over where smart investment managers told us that “spreads were too narrow” in the credit world. In fact, despite our repeated asking, we could find almost nobody who would admit to buying at then prevailing prices. This lack of opportunity caused these managers to hold cash or, more often, drift out of their competency in credit analysis into other areas like public equities, LBOs, etc. We spent a little time trying to figure out who was actually buying these assets but frankly did not do a thorough job. What bothered me about this was that I felt like this was a consensus view and my strong preference is to be contrarian.

I have been noodling on the paradox of what it means for me to agree with the consensus - perhaps it is possible that a consensus view point can actually be contrarian? My conclusion is it can. When very large unnatural forces impact the market, an artificial, "unseen" consensus may be created that opposes the traditional "seen" consensus, allowing the seen consensus to actually be contrarian.

I refer to the unnatural forces creating the artificial, unseen consensus as "dumb money". It is dumb in the sense that is not invested with risk-adjusted return generation as its north star; it serves some master other than unfettered economics, be it regulatory or political. In that regard, it is mindless and dumb.

As I mentioned, the view that credit spreads were too tight was a consensus view. However, a thorough research job would have shown us that there was, in effect, an enormous regulatory bid. It was a bid from ABS in the form of CDOs, CMBS, CLOs, RMBS, etc. This was and remains purely a regulatory game where assets that do not have the most attractive properties from a regulatory capital standpoint (e.g., sub-prime no doc mortgages, 2nd lien small cap bank lending to an LBO company, BBB tranches of other ABS) are pooled and re-crafted to rate very well from a regulatory standpoint. Generally 75-85% of these pools of unattractive regulatory assets receive an attractive regulatory treatment (A rated or better) and the balance of the assets are held by unregulated owners that are willing to take low- or un-rated risk.

When you think about this, it is a fascinating reality: buyers had all kinds of incentives that had little to do with the quality or price of what they were buying and a lot to do with interference in markets by regulators and government that drove buyers toward assets for unnatural reasons. In essence, they were price insensitive and it led to unsustainable outcomes.

So we learned a lesson: Follow the Dumb Money. It leads you to the excess (and perhaps to opportunities for shorting).

So Where is the Dumb Money Today?
All of the above was a preamble to establish the case that human nature is fundamental, it causes recurring problems, and the problems are identifiable if we’re willing to hunt down the Dumb Money’s most recent activities. We saw in the recent credit bubble a regulatory Incentive Caused Bias that led buyers to overpay for high ratings and over-trust ratings agencies. Where is Dumb Money today?

It has bothered me for some time that the "seen" consensus view point seems to believe higher rates and more inflation are inevitable. It bothers me because I completely agree with it. I operate more comfortably in a contrarian circle and yet here I find myself rubbing shoulders with the masses. Perhaps it's simply another form of self-deception but I believe we are witnessing a volume of Dumb Money buying ("unseen" consensus) that registers near the right tail on an all time scale. And the Dumb Money ring master is us - the US taxpayer - via our body politic and our printing press operations at the Federal Reserve.

One of the causes of truly great inflations is that in the early stages of rapid money-printing, the price of a typical consumer's basket of goods doesn't immediately respond one for one with monetary creation. The economist Murray Rothbard was a student of past inflations. He refers to that phase of apparent central bank induced nirvana of rapid money-printing and stable prices as a "heady wine" for those operating the printing presses*. It reinforces the logic and encourages a continuation of the practice and, by the time the inevitable result is obvious, it is too late and often too politically difficult to cease, much less unwind. Today we have a Chairman of the Fed that has all but promised to continue debasing the currency by interfering with the Treasury and Agency markets ("quantitative easing" or QE) and is in the process of fulfilling a nearly $2 trillion execution of his QE thesis. Two. Trillion. And I doubt he'll be able to stop there.

Today, I believe the Dumb Money is in sovereign debt, specifically US Treasury Bonds.

Similar to when AAA CLO tranches were issued at par paying 20 bps over LIBOR, Ten Year U.S. Treasuries today are priced to yield 3.3% - not exactly a glorious return, even if inflation is subdued. A while back, Jim Grant coined the term “return free risk” to describe Treasuries at these levels. I believe that return free risk extends well beyond simple Treasury Bonds but before we get to that, let’s talk about why these are the home for today’s Dumb Money buyers.

In a world of global trade imbalances, a dollar-based reserve currency, deleveraging and defaults, Treasuries hold a special place. Combined with unusually favorable capital treatment at regulated institutions, the artificially steep yield curve created by the Fed has given banks a taxpayer gift to put a bid on longer bonds. Near term deflationary fears have a foot on the head of the short end. Foreign central banks – flush with IOUs from the Fed (“dollars” exported by our trade imbalance) – have to buy Treasuries or other dollar denominated assets every single day. Capital raised by banks must find a home and when those banks either lack quality borrowers or are uncomfortable lending precious capital out (or both) they buy Treasuries. Scared by the run on commercial paper last year, money market funds have shifted toward Treasuries. Capital market participants have shifted away from risk assets and toward Treasuries. Etc., etc., ad nauseum. Most importantly, the Fed itself has announced that it will purchase hundreds of billions of Treasuries and even more of Agencies (the sellers of which then take the newly printed dollars from the Fed and themselves buy Treasuries).

In summary, there are a slew of buyers for U.S. government issued debt (including, confusingly, the government itself) and in the current environment of fear of “risk” assets, “risk free” assets have caught a hell of a bid. Most of these buyers are buying for reasons that have nothing to do with absolute value. They are mindless, Dumb Money buyers.

While the inflationary 1970s taught investors that fixed income securities could be “certificates of confiscation”, Greenspan and Bernanke’s Great Moderation brought us a slightly different lesson: From Oct. 1, 1982 through Sept. 30, 2009 (which is three generations, in Wall Street measurements), the Merrill Lynch 7-10 Year U.S. Treasury Bond Index returned 10.0% p.a. Over the last 1, 5 and 10 year periods, it earned 8.0%, 5.7% p.a. and 6.8% p.a., respectively. Stocks as measured by the S&P 500 did not manage to differentiate themselves, besting bonds over the 28 year period by just over 1% per annum, but trailing massively over the 1, 5 and 10 year timeframes.

As such, we have generations of Wall Streeters that have grown to appreciate and believe in the risk free return of U.S. Treasury Bonds, adding stickiness to their bid and reinforcing the mantra of “risk free” (another recent mantra, “home prices never decline nationally”). We have trade partners that are addicted to American IOUs ("dollars"), we have banks and insurance companies that are junkies for any regulatorily blessed capital rebuilding efforts and are now riding the yield curve dragon hoping to catch that old high, we have scared Boomers trying to preserve their precious retirement, we have a Fed that is encouraging the buying of Treasuries and that has itself become the global marginal buyer of Treasuries and Agencies. For the time being, the freshly printed money that is funding the Fed's purchases has not multiplied and filtered out to society, at least on a scale that has frightened the average American. We are in Rothbard's "heady wine" phase and so the process continues. As the merry-go-round spins, non-value oriented buying pressure is unnaturally manipulating prices, keeping them artificially high and yields artificially low.

The Dumb Money is in U.S. Treasury Bonds. They provide virtually no return and a ton of risk. They are, indeed, return free risk.

But, by definition, either this buying cycle will end voluntarily or a special dose of inflation will take hold. And when either of those occurs, what happens to rates?

Unlike other asset classes, U.S. Treasury Bonds denominated in dollars hold a special place in the world. They are considered the global Risk Free Return and are the benchmark for virtually every other asset class on Earth. Even to this day, despite the debacle of the past few years, homebuyers make their purchase decisions not on the economic return a house can generate, but on monthly payment affordability. That affordability is directly tied to Treasury yields and thus, homeowners are effectively short rates (or long long-duration bonds). Commercial real estate, when cap rates are in the 6-8% range as they are today, are attractive only if Treasury yields stay low. Today's price to earnings multiples of 17x or 18x (vs. historical averages of 15x) are implicit bets on low rates, all else being equal. Discount rates and WACC calculations for most people actually embed the 10 Year U.S. Treasury Bond into their calculation. Yield curve junkies are betting on stable or flattening curve-structure. How would floating rate borrowers perform in a rising rate environment, many of whom are skirting bankruptcy now on the backs of a sub 1.0% LIBOR?

And what about the U.S. Federal Budget? The average maturity on the Treasury’s debt is 50 months or so, meaning that the bulk of our issued debt has a four and a quarter year maturity or less, reflecting the U.S. Treasury’s attempt to take advantage of the most attractive end of the yield curve. Despite lower average rates, for the fiscal year-to-date through August (a September FYE), interest expense for the Treasury was $367 billion, eating up 20% of receipts.

We have built an entire world around the foundation of low rates. This is the thread that ties. The Singularity. This is the risk that could cause every asset in our portfolio to get face-punched, as diversity vanishes into the ether and the singularity saddles up.

If debasement activities continue much longer, inflationary expectations will take hold and rates will rise. They must to offset the losses created by monetary inflation, otherwise lenders will not lend and the government will not be able to finance itself. So rates will rise. Perhaps by a lot.

Imagine yourself in a world where instead of a 2s/10s yield curve of 0.9%/3.3%, we were in a world of 3%/6% or 6%/10%. What does that world look like? I’ll take a crack:

- Corporate profits suffer as financing costs skyrocket and customers pull back;
- P/Es contract massively and stocks get re-rated downward;
- Spreads widen on credit securities and absolute rates obviously back-up, leading to a severe decline in the value of credit securities;
- Homeowners get obliterated;
- Corporate borrowers get obliterated;
- Commercial real estate gets obliterated;
- This leads to giant holes in bank balance sheets;
- The annual Federal deficit gaps wider by nearly two-thirds of $1 trillion on U.S. Treasury interest alone (5% of GDP). That incremental deficit is the size of the entire deficit we suffered under Bush2 when we already thought the deficit size was unsustainable. Interest expense alone could theoretically consume nearly half of all Federal tax receipts. How do you ever recover from that?

As such, the Federal Reserve faces a Faustian bargain with a choice between letting nature take its course and walking away (allowing the deflation and liquidation phase of the cycle that the market demands) or to monetize aggressively. What do you think the Fed will do in that scenario? Abandon the Treasury and allow her to default? Monetizing is the Occam’s Razor outcome, despite the problematic result of reinforcing the higher rate regime. Bernanke has said again and again that he will not late the “mistakes” of the past recur. He has already and will continue to use freshly printed money to fill the money supply vacuum left by damaged, deleveraging banks. The government may struggle to find enough buyers to take on the new supply of debt the deficit would demand, forcing Bernanke to either let the Treasury deal with its own problems or to monetize the debt.

He will monetize.

As dollar holders rationally begin to question the value of their currency and the sustainability of its purchasing power, commodity prices will rise to reflect a weak dollar and the velocity of money will accelerate as demand for money diminishes**. Interest rates will rip, financial assets will face valuation headwinds, levered entities that need to refinance, sell or deal with floating rate obligations will spiral toward bankruptcy. The singular thread that ties virtually all asset classes is low rates. We need to be prepared for the pain that will occur when higher rates aggressively yank that thread and unravel the world.

Worst of all, this is a self feeding cycle that will persist as long as deficits grow as a percentage of output or the government continues to monetize debt. If nobody steps in to break the cycle (e.g., Volker), at some point utter devastation results.

I will go out on a limb and state that if rates rise too much and the monetization cycle loses control, a number of non-investment risks that can be difficult to mitigate may arise. These include the erosion of the dollar’s reserve currency status, cessation of tax-exempt status for not-for-profits, overtly confiscatory behavior by governments, much higher tax rates, a challenged system of fractional reserve banking, and the potential for civil unrest. Some of these are unavoidable and difficult to mitigate. But we should try.

How Can We Prepare?
As we consider preparing for the more pure investment ramifications of this outcome, the vast majority of preparations should not be around profiting, but instead should be built around preservation of purchasing power and asset protection/defense. From a macro standpoint, printing new money shifts a portion of every existing dollar's purchasing power to the hands of the person holding the newly printed dollar (the government and banks). This means the government will likely steal more and more of society's purchasing power through this particularly unconstitutional tax. Simply treading water from a purchasing power standpoint will take yeoman's work because we'll be fighting this backdoor wealth confiscation headwind. What are some steps we can take?
- Aggressively shift our equity exposure into high quality, unlevered, low capex businesses. Businesses with global or purely foreign operations may be preferred
- Immediately diversify a meaningful portion to non-U.S. domiciled custody, outside the grasp of our government if true tail risk arises (the new country’s stability must be considered as well). This is low cost, super high value insurance for a magnitude 10 Earthquake on the Richter scale. Seems like a no-brainer.
- On the margin, move our asset allocation toward cash and move “cash” toward select commodities and select foreign currencies as our "new cash". Don't be tricked into believing that just because our "new cash" seems to move everyday relative to the dollar means they have a special risk. Prices constantly move relative to the dollar for everything which means the dollar intrinsically holds the same risk. It just so happens that oil is quoted in dollars rather than dollars being quoted in oil. But the fundamental relative risk is the same, particularly if the dollar’s reserve currency status dissipates. Within commodities, focus on fixed or diminishing resources such as precious metals and energy resources, (maybe agricultural land).
- Avoid all Treasuries and, if we must hold some, keep it all in TIPS even beyond implied inflation levels where we might normally sell (recognizing that we are reliant on the CPI calculation, which is dangerous).
- Prepare for a distressed cycle - huge opportunity.
- Short long-duration Treasuries, perhaps through long-dated, well out of the money puts. Do it in a size that moves the needle and is perhaps surprisingly far out of the money. Long-dated is key. The issue is they are expensive today.
- Short a basket of credit spreads that are too tight, perhaps some sovereigns too - the U.S. isn't the only country going down this road.
- Economic unions like the Euro bloc could be blasted apart as different countries desire massively different monetary and fiscal policy actions.
- Raise the cost of our money yet further - we should be increasingly selective with investing "new cash". The implication of this is that perhaps we need to prune our portfolio and exposure even further and build our new cash exposure.

Where Are We Now?
It is impossible to assess exactly where we are now and when this interest rate/inflation risk might manifest itself. We can’t know with certainty that rates will rise – Japan has defied this experience for twenty years (as an aside, Japan faces this risk as well, perhaps moreso). I have been saying for some time that I think Japan is the U.S.’s upside scenario. In any case, Japan has two advantages on us: 1) they began with a lower level of government debt as a percentage of GDP; and 2) they began with a much higher personal savings rate with which to internally finance newly issued debt (they also had a bigger bubble which meant the deflationary headwinds were bigger to begin with).

I think the U.S.’s peculiar situation is that, because we’ve acted much more aggressively faster, we have already begun to scare off the marginal central bank buyer. The Chinese have aggressively curtailed Treasury purchases. For instance, for the four months through July 2009, China only purchased $33.6 billion of Treasuries (and actually was a net seller during the months of June and July). The oil exporting nations have only added $3 billion to their aggregate $189 billion Treasury portfolios through July.

Stepping into their shoes has been the U.S. Federal Reserve. The left pocket (the U.S. Treasury) is issuing bonds and the right pocket (The U.S. Federal Reserve) is buying bonds with newly printed money. In March, the Fed authorized $300 billion of Treasury purchases, $200 billion of agency debt (Fan and Fred) and $1.25 trillion of agency MBS. In the last week of September alone, the Fed reported buying $5 billion of Treasuries, $3 billion of agency debt, and $39 billion of agency MBS. Its 29 week average for these purchases has been $35 billion per week. Since the late March authorization was put in place, the Fed has bought $291 billion of Treasuries (out of $300b authorized), $700 billion in MBS ($1.25T authorized), and $130 billion of agency debt ($200b authorized). This totals $1.1 trillion and the Treasury bond specific buying authorization is basically used up, though the agency capacity is still ample to last another several months. Of course, the Fed can expand its authority at any time.

The point is, we’ve had $1.1 trillion of money brought forth by the Fed and put into the world over the last six months. The run-rate of the Federal deficit is not shrinking – so how can the Fed stop? Who will step into their shoes?

Imagine what the world would look like if that $1.1 trillion did not exist today.

And so we watch.

But one thing we know is this rate of monetization cannot continue indefinitely without being hugely inflationary, which leads to rising rates. We also know that if the Fed were to suddenly stop, marginal buyers that can step into the Fed's shoes do not seem to exist at today's yields. So a cessation would also lead to rising rates. The Fed’s obvious hope is that they can restart the economy (despite worsening employment and default trends) so that someone can replace their buying or so that the government can cut spending / raise tax receipts and bring the deficit back to more manageable levels. They would then theoretically slowly but steadily unwind their QE, somehow without tipping the economy back into crisis mind you, and take the inflationary risk out of the room. I suppose anything is possible, but I am skeptical.

Further, it is quite possible that we actually suffer from continued deflation, which would seem to justify low nominal rates. The issue, of course, is that a) this is bad for risk assets in general in a society as levered as ours; and b) if we suffer continued deflation, the ensuing inflation will be even worse because it will provide Bernanke cover for even more aggressive debasement tactics. He's playing with fire in a dry forest, but he obviously believes nothing major will come of it.

When this heady wine phase passes and the hangover comes, I hope we are prepared. We have no excuse not to be. It is the most obvious risk in the world, but we have been numbed to it by three decades of apparent stability. The Dumb Money is trying as hard as it can to keep the music on and the party going. However, the more drinks we have, the less fun tomorrow morning will be.

It is time to prepare.

* Rothbard's more full quote is from his book The Mystery of Banking and it reads as follows: "Unfortunately, the relatively small price rise often acts as heady wine to government. Suddenly, the government officials see a new Santa Claus, a cornucopia, a magic elixir. They can increase the money supply to a fare-thee-well, finance their deficits and subsidize favored political groups with cheap credit, and prices will rise only by a little bit!

"It is human nature that when you see something work well, you do more of it. If, in its ceaseless quest for revenue, government sees a seemingly harmless method of raising funds without causing much inflation, it will grab on to it. It will continue to pump new money into the system, and, given a high or increasing demand for money, prices, at first, might rise by only a little."

** "Demand for money declining" may seem non-intuitive, but what we are really saying is that people who sell things demand more money for the same good or service or, described from the inverse, that consumers will prefer goods and services that can be purchased today to the risk of holding dollars for more expensive goods and services tomorrow.

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

Seven Bank Failures - Sheila, Sheila, Sheila

Well, after a few weeks of sitting on their hands costing tax payers money, the FDIC decided to continue slowly doing their job and shut seven more banks this past Friday.

You may say, "TILB, they shut seven banks, how can you say they are slowly doing their job?" Well, it was three months ago that - using some simple back of the envelope math - we predicted 250 banks would close in the ensuing 15 months. That would have meant about 300 failures through October of 2010(obviously with more to come afterwards), which was well above consensus.

Since then, loan performance has worsened and we've learned that the FDIC has ramped its staff by 10,000 - 15,000 employees. We suspect they will not sit idly be as a total waste of taxpayer money (simply a partial waste). Our current view is that ultimately we could have closer to 1,000 failures than 500, with several hundred (500+ coming before the end of 2010). It is our opinion that one dark, cold Friday, rather than the 3-6 weekly failures we've become accustomed to over the past few months (itself a step function up from the 1-2 we were used to pre-June 09), we will witness 10-15 failures. That should serve as a clarion call that it is go-time.

In any case, this was one of the largest failure weeks in nearly two decades (measured by number of banks). Seven failures.

So, let's go to this week's stats:

Red Jersey of Shame Leaderboard - Florida picks up three points, Georgia one and Illinois one. Cali picked up one last week. As an aside, much like Bill Poole, Illinois's state banking regulator is SHAMEFUL, he should be ashamed!:
Georgia 20, Illinois 17, California 10, Florida 9.

Weekly Failure Summary:
Partners Bank, FL
Assets: $66mm, FDIC Losses: $28.6mm, Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 43.7%

American United Bank, GA
Assets: $111mm, FDIC Losses: $44mm, Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 39.6%

Hillcrest Bank Florida, FL
Assets: $83mm, FDIC Losses: $45mm, Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 54.2% (that's not a typo)

Flagship National Bank, FL
Assets: $190mm, FDIC Losses: $59mm, Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 31.1%

Bank of Elmwood, WI
Assets: $327mm, FDIC Losses: $101mm, Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 30.9%

Riverview Community Bank, MN
Assets: $108mm, FDIC Losses: $20mm, Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 18.5%

First DuPage Bank, IL
Assets: $279mm, FDIC Losses: $59mm, Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 21.1%

Straight Average Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 34.2%
Weighted Average Losses as a Percentage of Assets: 30.6%
So, another ho-hum week: seven failures, continued ugly trending in loss levels, more obfuscating loss sharing agreements, etc.

Actually, the loss sharing agreements, while massive gifts to their recipients are not totally crazy (just mostly crazy). It basically equates to the FDIC paying the asset acquiror to manage the assets so that the FDIC doesn't have to. The FDIC already has $40-50 billion of inherited toxic assets to deal with, so it's basically giving sweetheart deals to acquirors to avoid adding to its already overwhelming burden. As an aside, this is in essence one of the reasons that banks are choosing not to foreclose on effectively defaulted CRE assets (in addition to defering the magnitude of the writedown): it allows the banks to outsource the property management while they get their own house in order.

Green shoots.

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Stuy Town Teeters; SL Green, Tishman Speyer And Others To Get Poleaxed

Big, looming CRE default. Acquired for $5.4 billion, estimated to be worth $2.1 billion. Oops.

The WSJ does a great job reporting. Here are our favorite parts of the article [emphasis added]:
One of the biggest, most high-profile deals of the commercial real-estate boom is in danger of imminent default, say people familiar with the matter, signaling the beginning of what is expected to be a wave of commercial-property failures.

The sprawling Manhattan apartment complex known as Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town -- acquired for $5.4 billion in 2006 by a venture of Tishman Speyer Properties and a unit of BlackRock Inc. -- is running out of cash. As of the end of September, it had $33.7 million left of the $400 million in interest reserves set up to service its debt, according to the people familiar with the matter. At its current burn rate of about $16 million per month, the reserve could be depleted before the end of the year, the people said. Others have said the venture could avoid default until February.

The spokesman for Tishman Speyer declined to comment on behalf of the partnership.

The ownership, which includes a roster of high-profile investors from the Church of England to the California Public Employees' Retirement System, has no current plans to inject more capital into the venture, according to the people. Lenders who financed the deal first projected the complex's net operating income would triple to $336 million in 2011 from $112 million in 2006, according to Deutsche Bank AG. But net income is projected to be $139 million this year, according to Realpoint LLC, a credit-rating agency.

Investors who bought into the deal were confident that real-estate manager Tishman Speyer would be able to greatly boost profits by raising rents in Manhattan's sizzling apartment market. But today, the 56-building, 11,000-apartment property is suffering from a slowing New York economy, a lawsuit that has hindered the owner's ability to convert rent-controlled units to market rentals, and the debt load.

Realpoint estimates that the property is worth only $2.1 billion now, less than half of the purchase price. By that measure, all the equity investors and many of the lenders, including Government of Singapore Investment Corp., or GIC; Gramercy Capital Corp.; and SL Green Realty Corp., are in danger of seeing most, if not all, of their investments wiped out. Hartford Financial Services Group, which bought $100 million of the debt tied to the property, said it has "sufficiently reserved for ths asset in the first half of this year."

...

These projections convinced Calpers and the pension funds of several other states to make large equity investments in the deal. Meantime, the Tishman/BlackRock venture put a $3 billion first mortgage on the property and another $1.4 billion of so-called mezzanine debt[TILB - donut].

...

But even a victory by the Tishman/BlackRock partnership likely won't save the deal from a default. One indication: a "special servicer" is in the process of taking over the deal's CMBS debt, say people familiar with the matter. Special servicers are experts in dealing with troubled loans. The transfer to the special servicer, CW Capital, could occur as soon as this month, the people said.

Major players in these talks will likely be Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which together own more than $1.5 billion of the most highly rated, triple-A slices of the CMBS debt, according to people familiar with the matter. They would likely benefit from a fast foreclosure because, as senior lenders, they would be paid back first. [TILB - Let's hope it's worth $2.1 billion and not less as the AAA is probably already modestly impaired at that valuation...]

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

Sam Zell Interview On CNBC: Talks Residential, CRE, Brazil, Tribune, And More

Sam Zell was interviewed by the Money Honey, Maria Bartiromo, on CNBC after today's close. He touched on a number of topics.

As always, The Grave Dancer is worth listening to.

When asked (paraphrasing) "fact or fiction the residential single family home market is seeing signs of rebounding", Zell basically agreed. He caveated by saying that he is not forecasting a strong rebound, rather an equilibrium that allows for normalization. He further said his views exclude the worst markets, on which he takes no opinion other than likely continued pain.

On commercial real estate, Zell said the only thing holding this market together is low rates (CRE mortgages tend to be LIBOR+). Believes that a huge portion of the CRE market is underwater, but as long as they can continue servicing their debt load, the banks will probably allow commercial mortgage borrowers to keep trying. Zell said that he thinks borrowers really begin cracking in two or three years, given his central view on when rates begin to rise.

Brazil is his favorite market in the world to own real estate assets in. Six main reasons:
1) An elected government that we get along with;
2) 180 million person populous gives the nation scale;
3) Energy self sufficient;
4) Commodity self sufficient;
5) An educated business class; and
6) Ease of doing business (this and #1 are the big differentiators from China which he also likes long term).

When asked about Tribune, Sam Zell said that from a macro perspective the print business will continue to struggle but will not disappear entirely. He expects to have the Cubs situation resolved soon (sounds like he's selling them ASAP).

Zell believes a big advantage is that he is not emotionally attached to investment assets. This fits with Buffett's frequently stated quote that "You have to have the right temperament. I tell the students who come visit me that if you have more than 120 or 130 I.Q points, you can afford to give the rest away. You don't need extraordinary intelligence to succeed as an investor. You need a philosophy and the ability to think independently. It doesn't make any difference what other people think of a stock. What matters is whether you know enough to evaluate the business."

Finally, Zell said he believes that many of the governmental social programs being proposed today (e.g., cap and trade, health care) have the ability to undermine the fragile state of confidence we have in society and that confidence is the key to recovery.

Enjoy the interview:












Florida CRE Carnage In Photos

(HT ZeroHedge)

ZeroHedge circulated this link of the carnage in commercial real estate in Southern Florida.

Lots and lots of empty storefronts and even emptier parking lots. Here are a few indicative samples. Enjoy?









Friday, July 17, 2009

Commerical Mortgage Defaults Continue To Skyrocket


The pile-up that is the CRE lending market is just beginning to reveal itself.

Unlike resi-mortgages, which hopefully are approaching Camp O'Donnell on the final legs of their death march toward consumer capitulation, commercial mortgages have just recently left Bataan. [sorry, insensitive reference - apologies in advance]

TILB recently came across a great graph that showed 60+ day delinquencies* for loans in CMBS by aggregate annual collateral vintage beginning in 2003 (this includes the vast majority of outstanding loans underlying CMBS). The X-axis shows the number of months since issuance and the Y-axis shows percentage of loans from that vintage that were 60+ days delinquent. See below for the graph.

Historically a graph like this would start out low and flat, trending up ever so slightly. Beginning in month 60 (year five), we'd see a spike up and then back down after the first set of maturities passed (forming a hump). The same would occur around month 84 (year seven) and so on. If well underwritten, each vintage should behave about the same. Certainly no vintage would show a meaningful spike beginning in month 16 (for 2007 vintage), 28 (for 2006) or 40 (2005). But that is precisely what the graph shows. And these upticks are not the beginning of humps; they are the beginning of rockets that have basically gone vertical.

As fascinating as those 2005-2007 vintages are (and they are indicating an astoundingly bad future), we find 2004 to be the most informative because that vintage has just hit its first round of maturities (5 year balloons). Perhaps it represents the proverbial canary?

Let us dig.

For 2004-vintage loans included in CMBS, 24% of those maturing in 2009 are 60+ days delinquent versus less than 2% for those maturing later. Read that again: 24% of all 2004 CRE mortgages packaged in CMBS that are maturing in 2009 are already 60+ delinquent. That's not 24% of all 2004 loans that already have matured in 2009, it's 24% of loans that already have or will mature in 2009 are 60+. 24% through May!?!?

By the end of 2009, this may very well be 40%+ as the five year loans underwritten in the second half of 2004 (and thus ballooning in 2H09) were written just as asset values seemed to take off and lending standards loosened. In fact, according to NCREIF's website, cap rates were still 7%+ for most of 2004, basically in the middle innings of the fateful cap rate plunge to nearly 5%.

In 2004, a few conservative folks thought CRE was getting a bit frothy, though for the most part underwriting standards were still reasonable (at least compared to the 2005 - 1H2008 period). Basically we are saying that the 2004 vintage is failing despite not being astoundingly "toxic". Underwriting standards and the valuations used to support them became progressively more "flexible" every year thereafter.

CMBS Delinquency Graph - May 2009

If the commercial mortgage delinquencies experienced so far in 2009 worry you, just wait until next year (2010) when the aggressively underwritten 2005 vintage has maturities, then 2011 when the 2004 seven year maturities and the egregious 2006 five year wave hits!

Every time you think the last car has hit the pile-up, just think about the ensuing year.

2012 is unfathomably bad: seven year maturities from 2005 originations and five year from 2007; two truly toxic vintages have big resets together.

TILB's personal view is that the way banks and insurance companies try to "solve" this nightmare is by extending maturities in exchange for some amount of new equity injection, tighter covenants and a new rate. This will not be practical in many situations, but it will occasionally be accomplished. This is not an act of charity; it will be their attempt at postponing the recognition of and provision for bad loans. Securitizations will probably be more aggressive in dealing with problem loans now which will keep pressure on CRE prices, preventing recovery.

In any case, as banks and insurers extend, it will have a suffocating effect on new lending as these loans will continue to eat balance sheet capacity for lending institutions (and new securitization will remain dormant). This lack of fresh lending capacity will obliterate CRE valuations for obvious reasons.

Watch what happens in two or three years when these postponed problem loans come due at the same time that two major maturity waves from problem vintages hit: a shitstorm of Texas sized proportions.

We look forward to watching Geithner and Bernanke somehow argue that Wells Fargo/Wachovia, Bank of America and the regional banks, which have just begun digesting these trends, are well capitalized. The ultimate losses lenders absorb will be astounding.

As a self aggrandizing aside, here's a brief reminder from TILB's annual Prediction and Surprises we wrote in late December and posted this past January (#3 and #6 in particular):
3) Housing prices cross the -30% peak to trough level (Case Shiller 20-city index). Commercial real estate becomes the watchword as housing price declines begin to slow toward the end of 2009.

6) The credit crisis is not arrested. After having rolled through housing, it begins its attack on commercial and corporate in force. The default rate for HY approaches double digits but bank debt only makes it to mid single digits (5-7%), so far. As I predicted a few years ago, the default wave continues to roll through credit sub-classes. While it was initially in subprime, which had the nearest resets and the lowest quality borrowers and collateral, we see it move into Option ARMs as people begin to reach 115% of their initial balance due to minimum payments and some 3/1 and 4/1 ARMs from the more toxic vintages of 06 and 05 hit resets. New CRE (commercial real estate) financing is unavailable at attractive interest rates and cap rates climb near double digits. That said, the CRE default wave only begins to pick up modest steam in 09 as the 5/25 balloons from 2004 and early 2005 approach or cross through their reset periods. Covenant-lite LBO debt performs horribly, but due to a lack of covenants, the defaults are really a 2010 and beyond phenomenon. Because each of these huge credit asset sub-classes really have staggered aggregate maturities, the credit crisis has trouble getting past us (subprime 2007-08, option ARM 2008-09, jumbo prime 2009-10, CRE 2009-14, full covenant bank debt 2009-10, HY 2009-11, muni 2010-11, cov-lite bank debt 2010-12). All flavors of credit are obviously correlated as the companies and institutions that provide the loans are the same for all kinds of credit and this continues to drive availability of credit down and the price of and standards for credit up. This adjustment hurts many people.
As the creator of the above graph noted, the only green shoot we are seeing is the vertical green line on the 2004 vintage mortgages.

* 60+ days delinquency generally indicates serious delinquency (whereas 30+ includes folks that may simply have foot faulted).

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Kirchner Rebuts Bill Ackman Of Pershing Square Re: GGP (General Growth Properties)

Thomas Kirchner of Pennsylvania Avenue Event-Driven Fund (PAEDX) has written a rebuttal to Bill Ackman's presentation on the merits of GGP that he gave at the recent Ira Sohn charity conference.

The crux of Kirchner's rebuttal is: NOI will be worse than Ackman expects, Ackman uses a flawed cap rate, Pershing uses faulty assumptions about the likely cost of GGP's debt (if it's successfully extended), and that dilution is likely which Ackman does not account for. Here is Kirchner's statement on Ackman's 7.5% cap rate:
Like most valuations, Pershing Square’s lives and dies with its cap rate assumption. Ackman contends that GGP should trade at a 7.5% cap rate, 100 bps better than Simon Property Group (SPG). 7.5% cap rates are not what malls trade at these days, if they trade at all. SPG itself trades at an implied 8.5% cap rate, and Pershing Square thinks that this cap rate discounts the risk of bankruptcy of SPG. Therefore, reasons Pershing Square, GGP should trade at a lower cap rate, resulting in a higher valuation. The problem with this argument is that it can be applied to GGP as well: if the maturity of the debt is extended by 7 years as proposed, the market will discount a potential liquidity squeeze at the new maturity date of the debt. In addition, we believe that an 8.5% cap rate for SPG only shows that SPG is overvalued. If we apply a more realistic cap rate (9%, in our humble opinion) to GGP, then the upside for the equity looks much less appealing. And we haven’t even mentioned dilution yet, which we will address in a moment. After dilution, the equity looks pretty close to fair value to us.
We at TILB think Kirchner was kind not to simply laugh at Pershing's 7.5% cap rate assumption. In fact, to rely on Simon's 8.5% cap in a market in which Simon has issued sub notes that were priced to yield 10.75% is lunacy.

In the end, Kirchner agrees that GGP equity likely has some value, though limited. In the footnote it is disclosed that Kirchner owns "securities" in either or both of GGP and Rouse (a wholly owned GGP subsidiary) which implies that Kirchner is a creditor.

So it seems that at least one creditor is laying the grounds for a battle over who will receive the economics of GGP. Obviously others are like-minded, despite Ackman's wishes that they simply obey his commands. We certainly look forward to an enjoyable fireworks display.

Hat tip: Manual of Ideas

-----------------------------

What do you think? Green shoots for GGP equity or zombie equity?

Monday, June 15, 2009

C.B. Richard Ellis Moves CRE Office Cap Rates To 12%

Wow.

CBRE was/is supposed to be the "asset light" real estate company. All the upside but limited downside...

Well, they just priced sub notes to yield 12% for eight years. All of this (plus some fresh equity the company recently raised from Paulson & Co.) is basically going to be used to term out some existing maturities.

That is expensive capital for simply refi'ing and paying down some of what's already in place.

We at TILB are not sure where "office" cap rates should be, but given the high perceived quality of the CBRE franchise and the nature of its underlying business economics, that same 12% feels like a reasonable starting point.

Of coursen that implies virtually all CRE REITs are zeros...

Happy green shoots to you all!