Hayman Capital's Kyle Bass Provides CNBC Interview On Japan, Europe And Munis

Watch, listen, learn. Also, here's a link to Bass's/Hayman's most recent annual letter.

Intro and Japan:


Europe:


Munis and Meredith Whitney:

Vaclav Klaus On The Failure Of The Euro Experiment

TILB Political Hall of Famer Vaclav Klaus, president of the Czech Republic, makes the point that "the Euro Zone has failed" in today's WSJ OpEd section. I could not agree more. Oh, to have Klaus as our president here stateside...

Below is the OpEd in its entirety and here is a link to the WSJ online site itself. The OpEd is basically a reprinting of an essay that he recently published via the Cato Institute (link here).

ESSAY - The Wall Street Journal
JUNE 1, 2010
'The Euro Zone Has Failed'
By VáCLAV KLAUS

After the fall of communism in 1989, the Czech Republic wanted to be a normal European country again as soon as possible, after being excluded from participating in the post-World War II European integration process for 41 years. The only way to achieve this was to become a member country of the European Union. We had no other choice, but the communist experience was still too "fresh." We wanted to be free and didn't want to lose our freedom and our finally regained sovereignty. Many of us were therefore in favor of a looser form of European integration, against the so-called deepening of the EU and against the creation of political union in Europe. People like me understood very early that the idea of a European single currency is a dangerous project which will either bring big problems or lead to the undemocratic centralization of Europe. My position was clear: With all my reservations, we had to apply for EU membership, but at the same time we had to fight against projects such as the euro.

As a long-standing critic of the idea of a European single currency, I have not rejoiced at the current problems in the euro zone because their consequences could be serious for all of us in Europe—for members and non-members of the euro zone, for its supporters and opponents. Even the enthusiastic propagandists of the euro suddenly speak about the potential collapse of the whole project now, and it is us critics who say we have to look at it in a more structured way.

The term "collapse" has at least two meanings. The first is that the euro-zone project has not succeeded in delivering the positive effects that had been rightly or wrongly expected from it. It was mistakenly and irresponsibly presented as an indisputable economic benefit to all the countries willing to give up their own long-treasured currencies. Extensive studies published prior to the launch of the European single currency promised that the euro would help to accelerate economic growth and reduce inflation and stressed, in particular, that the member states of the euro zone would be protected against all kinds of external economic disruptions (the so-called exogenous shocks).

This has not happened. After the establishment of the euro zone, the economic growth of its member states has slowed down compared to previous decades, increasing the gap between the rate of growth in the euro-zone countries and that in other major economies—such as the United States and China, smaller economies in Southeast Asia and other parts of the developing world, as well as Central and Eastern European countries that are not members of the euro zone.

Economic growth in Europe has been slowing down since the 1960s, thanks to the increasingly damaging economic and social system which started dominating Europe at that time. The European "soziale Marktwirtschaft" is an unproductive variant of a welfare state, of state paternalism, of "leisure" society, of high taxes and low motivation to work. The existence of the euro has not reversed that trend. According to the European Central Bank, the average annual rate of growth in the euro-zone countries was 3.4% in the 1970s, 2.4% in the 1980s, 2.2% in the 1990s and only 1.1% from 2001 to 2009 (the decade of the euro). A similar slowdown has not occurred anywhere else in the world (speaking about "normal" countries, e.g. countries without wars or revolutions).

Not even the expected convergence of inflation rates has taken place. Two distinct groups have formed within the euro zone—one (including most of the countries of western and northern Europe) with a low inflation rate and one (including Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) with a higher inflation rate. We have also seen an increase in long-term trade imbalances. There are countries where exports exceed imports and countries that lastingly import more than they export. It is no coincidence that the latter countries also have higher inflation. It has no connection with the world-wide crisis. This crisis "only" escalated and exposed longtime hidden economic problems; it did not cause them.

During its first 10 years, the euro zone has not led to any measurable homogenization of its member states' economies. The euro zone, which comprises 16 European countries, is not an "optimum currency area" as defined by the economic theory. Even Otmar Issing, the former member of the Executive Board and chief economist of the European Central Bank, has repeatedly pointed out (most recently in a speech in Prague in December 2009) that the establishment of the euro zone was primarily a political, not an economic, decision. In such a situation, it is inevitable that the costs of establishing and maintaining it exceed its benefits.

My choice of the words "establishing" and "maintaining" is not accidental. Most economic commentators were satisfied by the ease and apparent inexpensiveness of the first step (the establishment of the common monetary area). This helped to form the impression that everything was fine with this project.

The exchange rates of the countries joining the euro zone probably more or less reflected the economic reality at the time when the euro was born. However, over the last decade, the economic performance of euro-zone countries diverged and the negative effects of the "straight-jacket" of a single currency have become more and more visible. When "good weather" (in the economic sense of the word) prevailed, no visible problems arose. Once the crisis (or "bad weather") arrived, the lack of homogeneity manifested itself very clearly. In that sense, I dare say that—as a project that promised to be of considerable economic benefit to its members—the euro zone has failed.

The second meaning of the term collapse is the possible collapse of the euro zone as an institution, the demise of the euro. To that question, my answer is no, it will not collapse. So much political capital had been invested in its existence and in its role as a "cement" that binds the EU on its way to supra-nationality that in the foreseeable future the euro will surely not be abandoned.

It will continue, but at a very high price—low economic growth. It will bring economic losses even to non-members of the euro zone, like the Czech Republic.

The huge amount of money that Greece will receive can be divided by the number of the euro-zone inhabitants, and each person can calculate his or her own "contribution." However, the "opportunity" costs arising from the loss of a potentially higher growth rate, which is much more difficult for a non-economist to imagine, will be far more painful. I do not doubt that for political reasons this price will be paid and that the euro-zone inhabitants will never find out just how much the euro truly cost them.

The mechanism that will save the European monetary union is the increasing volume of financial transfers that will have to be sent to euro-zone countries suffering from the biggest economic and financial problems. Yet everyone knows that sending massive financial transfers is possible only in a state, and the EU, or the euro zone, is not a state. Only in a state there is a sufficient feeling of solidarity among its citizens. Only in a state—and unified Germany in the 1990s is an excellent example—can massive financial transfers be justified and made politically viable. (By the way, the inter-German financial transfers in that era annually equaled the whole sum potentially needed for Greece to survive). Twenty years ago, I happened to be the minister of finance in a dissolving political—and monetary—union called Czechoslovakia. I have to confess that the country broke up because of the lack of mutual solidarity.

That is why Europe will have to decide whether to centralize itself politically as well. Europeans don't want that because they know (or at least feel) that it would be to the detriment of liberty and prosperity. There is, however, a real danger that the politicians will do it anyway—behind the backs of those who elected them. And this is what bothers me most. The recent dealings in EU headquarters in Brussels—literally behind closed doors—about the aid package for Greece demonstrated that there is no democracy there. The German-French tandem made the decision on behalf of the rest of the euro-zone countries, and I am afraid this will continue.

It is evident that the euro—the European single currency—and the currently proposed measures to save the euro do not represent any "salvation" for the European economy. In the long run, it can be saved only by a radical restructuring of the European economic and social system. My country had a velvet revolution and made a radical transformation of its political, economic and social structures. Fifteen years ago, I sometimes joked that after entering the EU we should start a velvet revolution there as well. Unfortunately, this ceases to be a joke now.

The Czech Republic has not made a mistake by avoiding the membership in the euro zone. I am glad we are not the only country taking that view. In April, the Financial Times published an article by the late governor of the Polish central bank, Slawomir Skrzypek. He wrote it shortly before his tragic death in an airplane crash near Smolensk, Russia. In that article, Mr. Skrzypek wrote, "As a non-member of the euro, Poland has been able to profit from flexibility of the zloty exchange rate in a way that has helped growth and lowered the current account deficit without importing inflation." He added that "the decade-long story of peripheral euro members drastically losing competitiveness has been a salutary lesson." There is no need to add anything to that.

Václav Klaus has served as president of the Czech Republic since 2003

[click here for video of an excellent interview with Klaus by Peter Robinson from 2009]

Hayman Advisor's Kyle Bass: The Pattern Is Set

As we've said many times, we hate us some dollar and we hate us some yen even more than the dollar. The euro is an enigma. Other fiat currencies are subject - long-term - to the same issues. That leaves us with gold. Apparently Hayman's Kyle Bass agrees with us. This should come as no surprise to long-time TILB readers as we've highlighted Kyle's work/talks several times.

Below is the text of Hayman's most recent letter to its clients following the European debacle this weekend. TILB's immediate reaction was "holy shit, I don't want to own the euro", in spite of most Wall Street participants claiming this was a great showing of support for the euro. Our view was this "show of support" was more akin to a roadmap for self destruction. The euro's rally than recent retrenchment seems to support our initial take.

We lifted the below text it from First Adaptor's blog (click here for First Adaptor). Make sure to follow First Adaptor on Twitter.

The Pattern is Set - Betting the Bank on a Keynesian Free Lunch by Kyle Bass

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dear Investors:

With the avalanche of announcements over the weekend out of Europe and the IMF (and even the US Federal Reserve), I think it is important to communicate our views. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly prohibits direct monetization of fiscal deficits (i.e. printing money out of thin air in order to perpetuate deficit spending) because central bankers are (or I guess at least "were") aware it is the path to severe inflation or even hyperinflation. Just as the Romans did time and time again, the EU has now decided to change from the rule of law to the rule of man when it suits them. With none of the sixteen members of the currency union forecasted to be in compliance with the Maastricht Treaty (the foundation on which the EMU is built) in 2010, today's actions further attempt to eliminate the natural policing role that markets play with respect to egregious economic behavior. It looks like there will be no consequences for fiscal profligacy... no negative implications for continuing to spend far beyond one’s means... there will be nothing but moral hazard for running massive deficits as member countries can now hold hostage the entire EU (as Greece has done).

The ECB’s monetary policy action simply adds to the moral hazard that was originally created on the fiscal side of the problem. The pattern is now set. This is exactly how very smart people meeting together in order to "solve" a debt crisis frequently (and now permanently, it appears) mistake a solvency crisis for a liquidity crisis. From now on, it seems everything will be deemed to be a liquidity crisis that will be met with more "bail-outs" and debt financed spending. This will eventually break traction in a violent way and facilitate severe inflation or even hyperinflation. The one thing the EU taught us this weekend is that paper money will be worth less (maybe much less) in the future.

Germany weakened itself as it has now abandoned the core bargain of the Euro (which was that they would never be responsible for another country’s debt) by opting to be the largest guarantor of a new loan program that essentially makes European countries joint and severally liable for emergency funds for the worst fiscal offenders in the EU. It has begun a process of ceding its fiscal sovereignty to the over-indulgent countries. I still cannot believe Germany has done this. No wonder Merkel’s government is so unpopular. Meanwhile, I guess that Trichet must have decided on the lesser of two disastrous outcomes for fear that the very existence of their European Union was being called into question. He must have believed this to be the case as it would be the only rational reason to agree to such drastic measures – despite his blanket opposition to such policies just days ago and against the explicit wishes of the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank.

We believe that there is a “Keynesian End” to the policy du jour that governments can solve all their fiscal and economic problems with more debt and more cross guarantees (aided and abetted by desperate central bankers). We at Hayman believe this theoretical endpoint is reached when debt service exceeds government revenues. Of course, any particular country has certain fixed expenses beyond debt service; therefore, the real endpoint occurs significantly in front of our definition. Outside of Greece and “Club Med” countries, Japan will begin to grace the front pages of newspapers very shortly. Japan has already reached a point where its central government tax revenues are eclipsed by debt service and social security payments alone. Coupled with its debt and demography problems, the world's second largest economy is about to enter a real bond crisis.

Attached is a Bank of International Settlements working paper that I highly suggest you read [TILB - link to referenced working paper here]. Please pay particular attention to the chart on the top of page 11 and remember the numbers you are seeing are as a percentage of GDP and NOT government revenue. This paper takes a very conservative view of interest rates (it essentially assumes they stay flat from the low levels of a few months ago – regardless of changes to debt levels or savings rates) and extrapolates current fiscal projections and even assumes pretty robust global growth. Even in this somewhat utopian scenario, the Keynesian End arrives in many of the world's countries much sooner than is popularly believed.

The competitive devaluation will begin in full force with Japan needing a weaker Yen to grow exports, the US needing a weaker dollar in order to double our exports (under the current Obama plan), and the EU really needing a weaker euro in order to grow their own exports. It is no wonder that Bretton Woods failed so miserably in prohibiting “cheating” via currency weakening. It is also no wonder that the IMF and World Bank were created at that very same meeting in 1944.

We have also attached a chart showing total IMF commitments to member countries as a percentage of each respective country’s IMF quota. The magnitude of the initial EUR 30 billion commitment to Greece trumps all other commitments made throughout this crisis by multiples. This does not even include the EUR 250 billion announced for the broader Eurozone this weekend. By granting Greece more than 30x their quota, they are making a mockery of their own rulebook.

This weekend, the EU and the IMF effectively went all-in with a bad hand in the highest stakes game of financial poker ever played with the world. We believe the agreement released was nothing more than a Potemkin agreement in order to placate bond investors. In the end (and there will be a reckoning for many countries) nations, including the United States, need to dramatically cut spending and get their fiscal balances in order. Unfortunately, our elected officials are on the hamster wheel of electoral cycles and are not able to make tough decisions like this as they would likely not be re-elected without a “sea change” in public opinion towards government spending and deficits. We are therefore on the path to significant currency devaluation around the world that will likely result in significant inflation. We increased our holdings of gold on Monday morning as well as taking other steps to position ourselves for the most likely outcome over the next few years. Interestingly enough, based upon the market reaction in the last 36 hours, it seems the law of diminishing returns applies to bailouts as well.

Sincerely,

J. Kyle Bass
Managing Partner

Kyle is clearly cut from the Austrian cloth.

The Final Countdown: Greek Sovereign Default

The aptly named band Europe brought us the epic music video and song "The Final Countdown" about 20 years too early (I mean, who cares about the countdown to the end of communism - let's talk about the PIIGS sovereign default).

As I read all these articles about Greece's impending doom, it's hard not to hear in the back of my head the implied complaint, "why won't they just lend us the money for free? This doesn't make any sense. Just lend us the money for free!"

[emphasis added and comments in brackets]

Europe Weighs Possibility of Debt Default in Greece
New York Times
By STEPHEN CASTLE and MATTHEW SALTMARSH

European leaders are quietly considering whether to come to the aid of their troubled neighbor Greece amid fears that the nation might default on its debts and unleash another round of financial crisis.

Only a month after Dubai was rescued by its neighboring emirate Abu Dhabi, Germany, France and other European powers are discussing whether Greece might need a bailout too.

After a decade of debt-fueled profligacy, Greece is confronting what amounts to a run on the bank. And, despite repeated assurances from Athens, the nation’s strained finances have put already jittery financial markets on edge. On Thursday, the worries stretched all the way to Wall Street, where the stock market sank 1.1 percent.

Some economists worry that Greece’s troubles could have deep and lasting repercussions for Europe. The crisis poses complex challenges for the euro, which Greece adopted in 2001. The currency sank to a six-month low against the dollar and yen on Thursday.[ironically, TILB thinks letting Greece go could be an incredibly strong event for the euro]

“Greece failing is not an option, and lots of people think that we will have to intervene at some stage,” said one European finance official, who was not permitted to speak publicly on the matter. “It doesn’t have to happen, and we hope it won’t, but it would be better than seeing a default.”

...

But doubts have intensified over the credibility of the drastic austerity measures put forward to try to get Greece’s budget under control, in spite of concerted efforts by the Greek government to calm the markets.

Investors worry that the crisis in Greece could touch off a domino effect across Southern Europe. Many are fleeing bond markets in Portugal, Spain and Italy out of concern the troubles might spread. [TILB - Collectively known as the PIIGS when Ireland is included]

The market’s judgment has been swift and brutal. On Thursday, the difference between the interest rates on Greek and German bonds — a measure of the risk investors perceive in the Greek debt — rose to nearly four full percentage points, its highest level since the euro was adopted.

Officials in Athens, Frankfurt and Brussels remained adamant that Greece was not at risk of being forced to abandon the euro. [TILB - of course not. Could you imagine if they said, "hey, we're thinking of going back to the Drachma so that we can print our way out of this debacle?" That would be amazing.]

As a condition of any aid package, the Greek government led by Mr. Papandreou would be asked to provide a more detailed program to bring the country’s deficit — currently equal to 12.7 percent of gross domestic product — under control. European Union rules call for a maximum of 3 percent. Officials insist that any bailout must not put into doubt the credibility of the euro.

Another condition of any aid would be further guarantees over the reliability of Greece’s economic data. Last year the newly elected government in Athens announced a sharp upward revision of its deficit figures, which have since been exposed as seriously flawed.

Next week, the European Commission is expected to propose greater powers for the European statistical agency, Eurostat, to audit the accounts of national governments. [TILB - watch Czech president Vaclav Klaus give this interview where he presciently assesses the fact that the EU and the Euro are forfeitures of sovereignity and freedom, then watch the slow leech of powers from the states to the centralized United States of Europe]

The latest moves reflect a continuing skepticism among euro-zone members over the practicality of the plans put forward so far by the Greek government. Athens wants to reduce the deficit to 3 percent of G.D.P. by 2012, an objective described as unrealistic by one European diplomat, also speaking on condition of anonymity. These plans are also to be assessed by the commission next week.

Greece’s budget deficit is four times the E.U. limit, while the country’s debt amounts to 113 percent of G.D.P. But officials insist that, because Greece is not one of the euro zone’s larger economies, the problems created by its grim public finances can be absorbed. The Greek economy represents about 2.5 percent of the euro area’s G.D.P. [TILB - Japan is over 200% sovereign debt to GDP and the US is a bit over 80%. Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff show that 90% is the threshold past which few survive, as well as 60% externally financed debt to GDP - this latter point has been Japan's saving grace, though that is likely over]

...

For Greece’s neighbors, there is the possibility of a domino effect, with investors subsequently moving on to test the resilience of another heavily indebted member of the euro area — possibly Italy, whose debt is also 113 percent of its gross domestic product.

...

One option, deemed unlikely, would be issuing a sovereign bond for the entire 16-nation euro area. That would probably require complex legal changes among members. [TILB - see prior Vaclav Klaus reference]

...

On Monday, Greece paid a hefty 6.22 percent rate to borrow money in the bond market, underscoring investors’ concern. [TILB - and it's much more expensive for them already, just five days later. If memory serves us well, they have a number of huge maturities in April/May that will be challenging to finance affordably without German backstop...]

In an interview this week, the Greek finance minister, George Papaconstantinou, acknowledged that the high rates were punitive but asked that investors keep faith. Greece needs to raise at least 53 billion euros this year, much of it this spring.

People think this is news?

As we've been saying for a year, just wait until Japan blows. It's situation is nearly twice as bad as Greece's. Despite having 40% of the U.S.'s GDP, it has as much debt. If its blended cost of funding goes up from 1.5% to a bit over 3%, 100% of its tax revenue will be absorbed by interest expense. We're talking about the second largest economy in the world and it literally has no other options than massively debasing its currency or defualting on its debt (or, more likely, both). That's what they get for following Bernanke's wicked advice.

The sooner Japan blows, the better for the U.S. - I suspect our only hope of not suffering the same fate is to witness Japan's meltdown after having followed a similar prescription.

And as to Europe, just wait until Greece's implosion lights up Italy, which is a very large economy. That is the real worry the EU is facing: do we let Italy go?

Which brings us full circle, to The Final Countdown...